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I. INTRODUCTION
Within a single week in 2008, Aloha Airlines, American Trans Air
(ATA), and Skybus Airlines abruptly ceased operations.' Smaller carriers
EOS Airlines2 and Champion Air3 folded within the following two months.
Customers scheduled to fly on all of these airlines were left stranded with
little to no recourse. 4 Nearly 5,600 employees lost their jobs as a result of
these five airlines' closures. 5 Although attributable to a struggling economy
and rising fuel costs, this rapid succession of airline closures resulted largely
from a lack of adequate capital required to continue operations. 6
The typical airline suffers through the booms and busts of the economic
cycle as any business would. When an established airline fails, however, we
as passengers become unfortunate bystanders of the collapse. We may miss
the birth of a grandchild, the career-making interview, or the once-in-a-
lifetime vacation. When the dominant airline at a major city dissolves, the
businesses of that community have to fight to re-gain immediate access to the
markets in which they once conducted business. When an airline is healthy,
1 Low-Cost Carrier Skybus Calls It Quits, MSNBC, Apr. 4, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23962964/ [hereinafter Skybus].
2 David Kaminski-Morrow, All-Premium Carrier Eos Ceases Operations, FLIGHT
INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 28, 2008,
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/04/28/223307/all-premium-carfier-eos-ceases-
operations.html [hereinafter Eos].
3 Chris Walsh, Charter Carrier Champion Air Plans to Cease Operations, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 1, 2008,
http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/Apr/0 l/charter-airline-to-shut-downl.
4 Skybus instructed its stranded passengers to ask their credit card companies for
refunds. See Skybus, supra note 1.
5 Data compiled from the following sources: Dave Segal, Aloha Air Shuts Down,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Mar. 31, 2008,
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2008/03/31/news/story0l.html; Skybus, supra note 1;
Walsh, supra note 3; Harry R. Weber, All-Business-Class Niche Airline Eos Folds, USA
TODAY, Apr. 28, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2008-04-27-eos-
folds N.htm.
6 See infra Part III.A.
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businesses expand, families reunite, and diplomatic ties are rekindled. In the
end, a stable and healthy air transport system contributes to the global
connections that bind us together as societies.
U.S. carriers require enormous capital to operate, and because federal
laws limit their ownership and control to U.S. citizens, the source of that
capital has far-reaching implications. If the U.S. is suffering adverse
economic conditions, U.S. capital is scarce, but allowing foreign ownership
in U.S. airlines makes available new sources of capital and likely allows
foreign investors to rescue ailing U.S. carriers. Proponents of restrictions on
foreign ownership cite concerns about safety, domestic employment, and
national defense, and for the most part, Congress has listened. While recent
events in the airline industry seem to suggest that these generalized anxieties
are unfounded, potential risks to national defense exist. With regard to
national defense risks, what the United States fears should not be whether a
foreign private entity takes control of a U.S. airline but whether a foreign
government takes such control.
This Note will first discuss the background and purposes of foreign
ownership restrictions, including the method by which the U.S. Department
of Transportation polices these restrictions. While outlining this background,
this Note will address the history of bilateral aviation agreements that govern
air services between two countries, including the wave of liberal "Open Skies
agreements" enacted by the U.S. beginning in the 1990s. Part III details the
arguments for and against liberalizing the foreign investment restrictions in
U.S. airlines, dispelling arguments made against liberalization based on
safety and employment while emphasizing issues of national defense and the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program (CRAF). In doing so, the Note discusses the
U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement, which partially liberalizes air travel
between the U.S. and European Union states. Part IV argues that given
circumstances specific to most EU countries and the agreement between the
U.S. and EU, any relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions should be
initially tailored to EU nations. This Note also cautions against unsupervised
liberalization of the restrictions and proposes that the Department of
Transportation continue to monitor ownership structures of U.S. airlines to
ensure that non-EU nations and other foreign governments do not exert
control over U.S. airlines. The possibility of foreign government ownership
poses the primary threat to the Department of Defense's Civil Reserve Air
Fleet Program.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Statutory Foreign Ownership Restrictions
Congress began regulating the burgeoning air travel industry with its
passage of the Air Commerce Act of 1926. Among its myriad provisions, the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 required that U.S. citizens hold at least 51%
ownership in U.S. carriers and occupy at least two-thirds of a U.S. carrier's
board director positions in order to possess aircraft registered in the U.S. 7
The House Report notes that these restrictions were in place to enable U.S.-
registered aircraft to receive "the protection of [the U.S.] flag when abroad, '8
while at the same time limiting the "exclusive privilege" of domestic air
commerce to U.S.-owned aircraft. 9 Some have also suggested that one
motivation behind the restriction was to prevent foreign governments from
using U.S. aircraft as war instruments. 10 Congress further refined control
with respect to U.S. airlines by enacting the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
which required U.S. citizens to control 75% of a domestic airline's voting
stock.'I By means of a 2003 amendment, 12 Congress expanded the statute to
clarify that an airline is a U.S. citizen if it is "under the actual control of
citizens of the United States"; this language is included in the statute's
current form. 13
7 Pub. L. No. 69-254, §§ 3(a), 9(a), 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
8 H.R. REP. No. 69-572, at app. § 2(A) (1926), reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTICS,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, at 34 (1928).
9 Id. Prior to the Act, the U.S. had already agreed to nationality requirements with
regard to aircraft registration under article 7 of the Convention Relating to International
Air Navigation in 1919, of which the U.S. was a signatory with reservations. Convention
Relating to International Air Navigation, art. 7, Oct. 13, 1919, reprinted in CIVIL
AERONAUTICS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, at 159 (1928)
("No aircraft shall be entered on the register of one of the contracting States unless it
belongs wholly to nationals of such State.").
10 See Bimal Patel, A Flight Plan Towards Financial Stability-The History and
Future of Foreign Ownership Restrictions in the United States Aviation Industry, 73 J.
AIR L. & COM. 487,488-489 (2008) (noting how the U.S. sought to prevent the German
government from acquiring U.S. aircraft).
11 Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 1 107(i)(6), 52 Stat. 973 (1938); see Patel, supra note 10, at
489 (attributing the percentage increase to Depression-era protectionism).
12 Congress passed the amendment in 2003 as part of Vision 100-Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 807 (2003).
13 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15)(C) (2006). At the time of this writing, Congress has
been considering an FAA reauthorization bill that would, in fact, strengthen foreign
control restrictions as opposed to liberalizing them. H.R. 915, 111 th Cong. § 801 (2009).
The bill clarifies "actual control" as requiring U.S. citizen control over "all matters
pertaining to the business and structure of the air carrier, including operational matters
[Vol. 72:1
NA VIGA TING THE COMPLEX SKIES
In the early 1990s and the early 2000s-periods during which the U.S.
airline industry experienced significant financial difficulties-two
presidential administrations considered the possibility of loosening the
foreign ownership restrictions to stabilize the industry. In 1992, the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) issued its first report on the control and
investment restrictions governing U.S. airlines.14 The report noted that four
principal reasons motivated the restrictions: "(1) protection of the heavily
subsidized fledgling airline industry, (2) regulation of international air
service through bilateral agreements negotiated with foreign governments,
(3) concern about allowing foreign aircraft access to U.S. airspace, and (4)
military reliance on civilian airlines to supplement airlift capacity."' 5 The
first and third concerns are more easily dismissed in the current industry
environment than they were several decades ago; the airline industry is no
longer "fledgling," and an abundance of foreign aircraft enter U.S. airspace
everyday to reach U.S. destinations. 16
B. The Department of Transportation 's Regulation of Foreign
Ownership
The Department of Transportation (DOT) plays a key role in determining
whether a U.S. carrier has met its U.S. ownership obligations in order to be
certified to operate.17 DOT has interpreted citizen control to mean "day-to-
day management decisions made by U.S. citizens," 18 which colors DOT's
determination of citizenship despite an airline's ability to meet the threshold
percentage for U.S. ownership. 19 DOT evaluates whether U.S. citizens have
such as marketing, branding, fleet composition, route selection, pricing, and labor
relations." Id.
14 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION - IMPACT OF CHANGING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CONTROL LIMITS ON U.S. AIRLINES 1 (1992) [hereinafter
GAO 1992].
15 Id. at 12-13.
16 See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Summary 2008 Traffic Data
for U.S and Foreign Airlines: Total Passengers Down 3.5 Percent from 2007, Apr. 23,
2009, available at
http://www.bts.gov/press-releases/2009/bts0 19_09/html/bts0 19_09.html (finding that
both U.S. and foreign carriers operated 10.7 million domestic and international flights
involving a U.S. airport in 2008).
17 14 C.F.R. § 119.33 (2010) (requiring U.S. citizenship for air carriers and
commercial passenger or cargo operations).
1 8 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUEs RELATING TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
CONTROL OF U.S. AIRLINES 2 (2003) [hereinafter GAO 2003].
19 See Patel, supra note 10, at 490-91 (discussing Willye Peter Daetwyler, 58
C.A.B. 118 (1971)). The case involved a carrier whose control was scrutinized even
when it had met the statutory requirements for U.S. ownership. In the view of the Civil
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actual control over an airline on a case-by-case basis, analyzing both
contractual agreements and corporate structure.20 DOT and its predecessor
agencies have been reluctant to find U.S. citizenship when a foreign entity
could merely exert influence over the carrier's decisions.21
By the 1990s, the world political environment left the U.S. without a
clear military enemy or rival, thereby weakening some of the 1926 reasoning
for protective measures on foreign ownership. DOT nevertheless continued
its restrictive stance on foreign investment in U.S. carriers, maintaining the
position that any foreign ability to influence a carrier's decision would result
in a revocation of the U.S. citizenship of the carrier. A deal between British
Airways and US Air 22 in the early 1990s, for example, was potentially
problematic because the agreement would have allowed British Airways-
appointed board members on US Air's board to veto decisions made by other
board members.23 After the two sides made some necessary changes to the
agreement, DOT allowed the transaction to proceed.24
Just prior to the British Airways-US Air deal, Northwest Airlines
(Northwest) entered into a merger agreement with Wings Holdings (Wings),
Aeronautics Board (one of the governing agencies at the time), the carrier needed to
prove that the "substance of the transaction [was] in accordance with the policy." Id. at
491.
20 Id.
21 See Intera Arctic Servs. Inc., 1987 DOT Av. LEXIS 337, at *9 (Aug. 18, 1987);
see also Patel, supra note 10, at 495 (citing In re The Citizenship of DHL Airways, 2004
DOT Av. LEXIS 404, at *22 (May 13, 2004)). However, DOT has not seemed as active
in shielding U.S. airlines from foreign influence with regard to contractual obligations
arising from debt agreements. See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, US Airways and America
West Plan to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/business/20air.html?pagewanted= 1 &_r1 (noting
how Airbus SAS, a subsidiary of European plane manufacturer EADS, provided a $250
million loan to US Airways in return for US Airways' decision to purchase new Airbus
aircraft in the future); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government
Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 569 (1995) ("A valid distinction exists between a
corporation in which the federal government has taken an active role in management or
control, and a corporation in which the government finds itself temporarily holding the
debt or equity of a going concern .... "). A discussion of the challenges posed by
government ownership in the airline industry follows in Part III.D.2.
22 US Air changed its name to US Airways in 1996 subject to a rebranding strategy
under the direction of CEO Stephen Wolf. Suzanne Wooton, USAir Announces New
Look, Name Change to US Airways, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 13, 1996, at IC.
23 Patel, supra note 10, at 493.
24 ISABELLE LELIEuR, LAW AND POLICY OF SUBSTANTIAL OWNERSHIP AND
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF AIRLNES 38 (2003). The alliance lasted for several years but was
discontinued in 1997 when it became apparent that the deal did not function as both sides
had hoped. GAO 2003, supra note 18, at 6.
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a private investment company. 25 DOT had ordered the parties to submit
information testifying to Northwest's continued fitness and citizenship as a
U.S. carrier. 26 DOT found that nearly two-thirds of Wings' voting stock was
owned by U.S. citizens; this block was able to appoint a majority of Wings'
board.27 KLM, the flag carrier for the Netherlands, had also heavily invested
in Wings, having purchased $350 million in preferred stock and $50 million
in common stock, with an option to purchase additional common voting
stock.28 KLM, in addition to its ownership of 5% voting stock, had the right
to appoint one member to Wings' board and the right to establish a three-
member committee to advise Northwest on its financial affairs. 29 Because
DOT was concerned about KLM's ability to exert control over Wings, DOT
compelled KLM to significantly reduce its share of equity, as well as its
access to sensitive information relating to Northwest's affairs. 30 Additionally
KLM was forced to forgo its right to establish a financial advisory
committee. 31 DOT's treatment of Wings was not based on the statutory
requirements for Wings' U.S. citizenship, which were met given the statutory
text at the time 32, but, rather, DOT was concerned about KLM exerting
"actual control" over the U.S. carrier Northwest through its investment in
Wings. 33 DOT later reconsidered the Wings case and allowed a modified
arrangement between Northwest and KLM to proceed, following an Open
Skies Agreement between the U.S. and the Netherlands. 34
Gradually through the late 1990s and 2000s, DOT began to rule more
favorably on deals involving foreign investment. During the mid 2000s, U.K.
mogul Sir Richard Branson sought to expand his Virgin Group brand
(Virgin) by incorporating a new U.S.-based carrier, eventually named Virgin
25 DEP'T OF TRANSP., AcQuISITION OF NORTHWEST AIRLINES BY WINGS HOLDINGS,
INC., DOT ORDER NO. 89-9-51, DOCKET No. 46371 (Sept. 29, 1989).
26 Id.
27 Id. at2.
28 Id.
2 9 Id. at 3.
30 Id. at 3-4.
31 DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 25, at 3.
32 See supra text accompanying note 12, relating to the 2003 amendment requiring
U.S. citizens exert "actual control." During the time period of the Wings deal, this
language was not in the statute.
33 DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 25, at 4-5 ("Analysis in this area has always
necessarily been on a case-by-case basis, as there are myriad potential avenues of control.
The control standard is a de facto one-we seek to discover whether a foreign interest
may be in a position to exercise actual control over the airline, i.e., whether it will have a
substantial ability to influence the carrier's activities.").
34 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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America.35 Branson had helped to develop similar Virgin-brand airlines in
other parts of the world, including Australia and Nigeria, with mixed
success.36 Due to Virgin America's close ties to the Virgin Group at its
inception, DOT officials were initially concerned about the amount of control
Branson and Virgin would exert over the U.S. carrier.37 In an order dated
December 27, 2006, DOT found that Virgin America had failed to establish
that it would meet the requisite U.S. control requirements in order to qualify
as a U.S. citizen under the Federal Aviation Act.38 Despite Virgin America's
75% voting control by a Delaware investment company (VAI) and its
predominantly U.S.-citizen management staff, DOT (on the urging of U.S.
carriers Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, Northwest
Airlines, US Airways, and American Airlines at various times during the
proceedings) determined that actual control of Virgin America was held by
foreign citizens. 39 Its decision noted the close ties the airline and its
management would have with Virgin and Branson, as well as the fact that
VAI's individual investors were found to be influenced by foreign entities.40
DOT did, however, leave the door open to future evidence proving Virgin
America's citizenship. 41 In response, Virgin America made what DOT
characterized as "material changes" to its debt financing structure and board
composition such that DOT was satisfied and declared Virgin America a U.S.
35 Dan Reed, Branson Flies Under the Radar as Virgin America Takes Off, USA
TODAY, Aug. 8, 2007, at BI (emphasizing Virgin America's Virgin roots).
36 Virgin sought to sell a 49% stake in Nigeria Eagle Airways (formerly Virgin
Nigeria) following fimancial difficulties and a dispute with the Nigerian government.
Matthew Green, Virgin in Talks to Sell Out of Nigeria, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/ceb26f6e-6el 7-11 dd-bSdf-
0000779fdl8c.html#axzzlFJGHCFGO. Australian carrier Virgin Blue is not only
profitable, but rapidly expanding. Geoffrey Thomas, Virgin Blue Celebrates Half-Year
Profit with Commitment for 50 737s, ATW DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 2010,
atwonline.com/airline-finance-data/news/virgin-blue-celebrates-half-year-profit-
commitment-50-737s-0427.
37 Reed, supra note 35.
38 DEP'T OF TRANSP., APPLICATION OF VIRGIN AMERICA, INC. - ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE, DOT ORDER No. 2006-12-23, DOCKET No. OST-2005-23307 (Dec. 27, 2006).
3 9 Id.
40 Id. at 15; see also id. at 16-20 (finding that actual control of Virgin America
would be in the hands of foreign citizens based on the following: "1. Virgin Group's
extensive influence over [Virgin America's] management ... 2. Virgin Group's
pervasive involvement in the creation of Virgin America ... 3. [f]unding provided by the
Virgin Group ... 4. [t]he Virgin Trademark License Agreement ... 5. [the fact that]
approval and/or consent of the Virgin Group must be obtained prior to certain changes
contemplated by Virgin America and VAI").
4 1 Id. at 20.
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citizen, granting it certification as a U.S. carrier. 42 Virgin America also
successfully assured DOT that a restructuring of VAI's control structure
would negate influence by foreign entities.43
Virgin America's citizenship came under scrutiny again in 2009 when
Alaska Airlines, citing a Wall Street Journal report suggesting that two of
VAI's controlling entities had surrendered economic rights back to Virgin,
filed a petition for a public proceeding. It claimed that Virgin America had
lost its U.S. citizenship status.44 By this point, Virgin America had operated
flights across the U.S. for over two years.45 DOT dismissed Alaska Airlines'
petition in January 2010,46 noting that new U.S. investors had contributed
personal assets in acquiring full control of VAI, among other changes to
Virgin America's control structure. 47 DOT was satisfied that these investors
had "greater incentive to actively participate in the strategic decisions of
Virgin America."'48
DOT also ruled favorably on an investment by German corporation
Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Lufthansa) in U.S.-based JetBlue Airways
Corporation (JetBlue), which gained approval in 2008. 49 Lufthansa acquired
42 DEP'T OF TRANSP., APPLICATION OF VIRGIN AMERICA, INC. - FINAL ORDER, DOT
ORDER NO. 2007-5-11, DOCKET No. OST-2005-23307 (May 18, 2007).
43 Id.
44 DEP'T OF TRANSP., ALASKA AIRLINES, INC. - RENEWED MOTION OF ALASKA
AIRLINES, INC. FOR A PUBLIC PROCEEDING, DOCKET No. OST-2009-0037 (Aug. 21,
2009).
45 See Press Release, Virgin America Inc., Virgin America Takes to the Skies (Aug.
8, 2007), http://www.virginamerica.com/va/press/2007/Aug/Takes-to-the-Skies.html
(noting the inauguration date of August 8, 2007); DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 44 (dated
August 21, 2009).
4 6 DEP'T OF TRANSP., APPLICATION OF VIRGIN AMERICA, INC. - ORDER DIsMISSING
PETITIONS, DOT ORDER No. 2010-1-5, DOCKET No. OST-2005-23307 (Jan. 8, 2010)
("We are not persuaded that the public interest requires us to institute a public proceeding
in this matter .... [I]t has long been the Department's practice to conduct continuing
fitness reviews informally. We have determined that an informal continuing fitness
review is appropriate here. We have completed such a review of Virgin America's
fitness, and have concluded that Virgin America remains a U.S. citizen, subject to certain
conditions.").
47 Business Review Letter from Susan Kurland, Assistant Sec'y for Aviation & Int'l
Affairs, Dep't of Transp., to Kenneth Quinn, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP,
Counsel for Virgin America Inc. (Jan. 8, 2010), available at
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/busrevletters/Virgin%20America%20Letter.pdf
[hereinafter DOT Virgin Letter].
48 Id.
49 Business Review Letter from Lauralyn Remo, Acting Chief, Air Carrier Fitness
Div., Dep't of Transp., to Jonathan Hill, Dow Lohnes PLLC, Counsel for JetBlue
Airways Corp. (Jan. 22, 2008),
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42 million newly issued common shares of JetBlue, or 19% of JetBlue's
equity. 50 The investment brought roughly $300 million to JetBlue, while
Lufthansa gained one seat on JetBlue's board of directors 51 with the
possibility of adding a second seat a year following the close of the
transaction. 52 DOT determined that JetBlue would retain its U.S. citizenship
status under the agreement, though it reserved the right to change its
determination in light of any substantial changes to JetBlue's corporate
ownership.53
DOT has articulated fewer concerns when an airline offers its shares to
the public. When now-defunct 54 MAXjet Airways, Inc. (MAXjet) proposed
an initial public offering (IPO) in the mid-2000s, DOT approved the airline's
self-enforcement proposals for adhering to foreign investment restrictions. 55
MAXjet planned to review the citizenship of any holder of its voting stock
and to immediately remove voting rights from any shares that would bring
total foreign control to greater than 25%.56 To accommodate this, investors
from countries without Open Skies agreements 57 with the U.S. would be
compelled to sell their shares within 90 days if their shares would bring
foreign control to 25% or higher.58 Under MAXjet's proposal, foreign non-
voting equity ownership would be allowed up to 50%, with any additional
foreign investors forced to sell their shares within 90 days. 59 MAXjet
indicated that it would conduct the sale itself if such criteria were met and
foreign investors refused to sell their shares.60 As in the case of JetBlue, DOT
required MAXjet to inform the department of any substantial changes to the
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/busrevletters/Ownership%2OApproval %2Letter.pdf
[hereinafter DOT JetBlue Letter].
50 Press Release, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Lufthansa to Make Equity Investment in
JetBlue; Will Buy up to 19% Stake for $7.27 per Share (Dec. 13, 2007),
http://www.lufthansa.com/mediapool/pdf/86/media492286.pdf.
51Id.
52 DOT JetBlue Letter, supra note 49.
53 Id.
54 MAXjet terminated operations on December 24, 2007. Maxjet Airways Ceases
Operations, BusiNEss TRAVEL NEWS, Dec. 24, 2007,
http://www.btnonline.com/businesstravelnews/search/articledisplay.jsp?vnu_contentid
=1003688400.
55 Business Review Letter from Andrew Steinberg, Assistant Sec'y for Aviation and
Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Transp., to William Kutzke, Gen. Counsel, MAXjet Airways, Inc.
(Mar. 12, 2007) [hereinafter DOT MAXjet Letter].
56 Id. at 1.
57 See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
58 DOT MAXjet Letter, supra note 55, at 2.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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ownership structure, and DOT reserved the right to reject MAXjet's fitness
should the changes fail to meet foreign ownership restrictions. 61
C. The International Aviation Environment: Bilateralism and Open
Skies
The global landscape for international carriers is primarily characterized
as a series of bilateral agreements negotiated between pairs of countries. 62
These agreements establish particular rights to each party of the negotiation,
including rights of access benefiting each party's air carriers. 63 A country
engaged in such an agreement exerts sovereignty over the air traffic over its
territory by retaining the option to refuse rights to those countries that refuse
to grant reciprocal benefits or to foreign carriers that refuse to comply with
the country's regulations.64 Restricting foreign ownership in one country's
airlines was one method for countries to enforce these bilateral agreements,
or at least, to continue to benefit from the route authorities afforded to its
airlines under one of these agreements.65
The restrictiveness of such agreements varied during the past couple
decades, typically specifying in detail the capacity and frequency of air
61 Id. at 2-3.
62 MAREK ZYLICZ, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT LAW 135 (1992).
63 The ability to provide air services to a foreign country is not a default right;
special permission must be granted by the foreign country. MICHAEL MILDE, ESSENTIAL
AIR AND SPACE LAW 100 (2008).
64 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1108(b), 72 Stat.
731, now codified and amended as 49 U.S.C. § 41703(a) ("A [non-military] foreign
aircraft ... may be navigated in the United States ... if the country of registry grants a
similar privilege to aircraft of the United States .... "). The text, though not from a
bilateral agreement itself, exemplifies the desire for reciprocal benefits that can
accompany bilateral arrangements: one country grants access to a foreign carrier as long
as the foreign carrier's country grants access to the first country's carriers, as an example.
65 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 7. Suppose a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and
China provided that only two U.S. airlines could fly into Shanghai's Pudong International
Airport. While the U.S. airlines are under the control of U.S. citizens, the U.S. benefits
from the bilateral agreement. If, on the other hand, China or another foreign country
assumed control of the U.S. airlines, then the U.S. no longer could control the airlines
intended to provide the U.S.-Shanghai service. For one, a foreign, non-Chinese company
that purchases control of the U.S. airline may be barred from operating the U.S.-Shanghai
service because its home country was not a party to the agreement between the U.S. and
China. In a different vein, if a Chinese company purchased both U.S. airlines operating
the U.S.-Shanghai route, then Chinese companies would effectively control all U.S.-
Shanghai service, eliminating the benefits the U.S. would receive under the bilateral
agreement.
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services between the two countries, among other provisions.66 One of the
well-known restrictive agreements in recent history was Bermuda II, which
governed air traffic between the United States and the United Kingdom.
Bermuda II, itself a revision of a less restrictive Bermuda 1,67 limited, among
other things, air service between the U.S. and London's lucrative Heathrow
Airport to two carriers from each country. 68 In the aforementioned case of
British Airways' investment in US Air, competing U.S. carriers successfully
challenged the proposed British Airways transaction by noting that Bermuda
II prevented U.S. investors from investing in any British carriers, thereby
denying U.S. carriers the same level of access to the U.K. market as British
Airways would receive in the U.S. market through US Air.69 Nevertheless an
altered arrangement between British Airways and US Air did pass DOT
scrutiny, with the agreement and all investments later discontinuing in
1997.70
Bilateral restrictions in U.S. agreements loosened in the early 1990s
when DOT actively sought Open Skies agreements with other nations. 71
DOT's new initiative targeted Europe, which was experiencing increased
economic liberalization between the various European states at the time. 72
The goal of Open Skies agreements is to make international aviation markets
accessible to the U.S., undoing traffic and capacity restrictions that
characterized previous bilateral agreements. 73 The U.S.'s first Open Skies
agreement was signed in 1992 with the Netherlands as a condition for DOT
approval of the Northwest-KLM alliance proposal under review.74
66 ZYL1cz, supra note 62, at 142.
67 Id.
68 Bermuda II Initialled, FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, Jul. 2, 1977, at 5. The process of
designating two carriers from each country to operate a route was referred to as "dual
designation." At the time of Bermuda II's signing, Laker Airways and B.CAL were the
British carriers granted permission to operate the London-New York route, and Pan Am
and TWA were the two American carriers granted the same route authority .... Id.
69 Patel, supra note 10, at 494.
70 British Airways Disposes of Last US Airways Stock, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1997, at
D4.
71 Seth M. Warner, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabotage
Restrictions Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 299 (1993).
72 Defining "Open Skies," 57 Fed. Reg. 19323-01 (May 5, 1992).
73 Id. Specifically the DOT order sought Open Skies agreements that would, among
other things, provide "(1) open entry on all routes; (2) Unrestricted capacity and
frequency on all routes; (3) Unrestricted route and traffic rights, that is, the right to
operate service between any point in the United States and any point in the European
country... (8) Open code-sharing opportunities." Id.
74 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 28.
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Since then nearly 100 countries have signed Open Skies agreements with
the U.S. 75 By early 2007, the U.S. had negotiated Open Skies agreements
with nearly twenty European countries, approximately three-quarters of
whom were EU member states.76 On April 30, 2007, the U.S. and EU signed
an air transport agreement that served as an Open Skies Agreement between
the twenty-seven EU member states and the U.S. 7 7 The agreement broadly
made available new air routes between the U.S. and EU member countries,
allowing airlines from the U.S. to fly from any U.S. city to any EU member
city, and vice versa. 78
While a significant step toward full liberalization, the agreement
maintains restrictions in a number of areas. U.S. airlines, for example, can
commercially fly between any two EU member states, but cabotage-the
ability to commercially operate a domestic route in a foreign country-for
both U.S. and EU carriers is forbidden within any EU state or the U.S.,
respectively. 79 The agreement also briefly addresses ownership restrictions.
For EU airlines and other investors, the U.S. foreign ownership restrictions
on equity investment and control remain in place, while for U.S. investors,
EU foreign ownership restrictions apply, requiring majority ownership and
control by EU citizens. 80 EU member states also reserve the right to restrict
foreign ownership in their airlines to the standards adhered to in the U.S.81
75 Open Skies Partners, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ata/I 14805.htm.
76 Id.
77 Air Transport Agreement, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4 [hereinafter U.S.-EU Agreement].
78 Id. art. 3, § 1(c)(i)-(ii) ("[Each party grants the other] the right to perform
international air transportation between points on the following routes: (i) for airlines of
the United States (hereinafter US airlines), from points behind the United States via the
United States and intermediate points to any point or points in any Member State or
States and beyond; ... (ii) for airlines of the European Community and its Member States
(hereinafter Community airlines), from points behind the Member States via the Member
States and intermediate points to any point or points in the United States and
beyond .... ).
79 Id. art. 3(6). For example, EU airlines do not have permission to commercially fly
between a U.S. city such as Chicago and another U.S. city such as Denver. U.S. airlines
do not have permission to commercially fly between the two Spanish cities of Madrid and
Barcelona, but they do have permission to fly between Madrid and a city in another EU
member state, such as Frankfurt.
80 1d. Annex 4, art. 1(1)-(2).
81 Id. Annex 4, art. 1(4) ("Notwithstanding paragraph 2, the European Community
and its Member States reserves the right to limit investments by US nationals in the
voting equity of a Community airline made after the signature of this Agreement to a
level equivalent to that allowed by the United States for foreign nationals in US airlines,
provided that the exercise of that right is consistent with international law.").
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The 2007 agreement was amended on June 24, 2010 without substantial
changes to existing ownership provisions.82
III. BALANCING THE BENEFITS OF INCREASED FOREIGN INVESTMENT
WITH ITS RISKS
As the introduction to this Note states, increased foreign investment
would not only provide beneficial effects to U.S. airlines-it may allow them
to survive. Liberalization of ownership restrictions is also more in line with
American ideals of free market capitalism.83 However, the positive effects of
liberalized ownership restrictions must be fairly balanced by arguments made
against such liberalization. To this end, the following sections consider both
the need and the risks of foreign ownership liberalization. The need for
capital is balanced by concerns about standards of safety, domestic
employment, and national defense. Although the following sections find that
concerns about safety and employment are outweighed by the need for
liberalization, this Note finds that the risk to national defense posed by
liberalization is significant.
A. The Benefit: The Need for Capital
Airlines live and die off of the ability to acquire capital. 84 Because of the
enormous sums of capital required to run the operations of an airline-let
alone start up or expand an airline-adequate financing is a regulatory
requirement for any airline in the U.S.85 Airlines benefit financially from
82 Protocol To Amend the Air Transport Agreement Between the United States of
America and the European Community and Its Member States, Signed on April 25 & 30,
2007, Protocol, June 24, 2010 [hereinafter U.S.-EU Amended Agreement], available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/143930.pdf (refusing to impose mandatory
changes to Annex 4 of the original agreement, which discussed ownership restrictions).
83 See, e.g., Patel, supra note 10, at 522 ("[F]ree market economic principles dictate
that private enterprises in the United States be given maximum choice in commercial
decisions.").
84 See, e.g., discussion on the financial bailout of America West Airlines, infra notes
172-73 and accompanying text; see also Patel, supra note 10, at 508 (noting the collapse
of several airlines around the world, including Swissair, Sabena of Belgium, and Ansett
Australia, who were unable to acquire new sources of investment capital); infra notes 99-
102 and accompanying text.
85 14 C.F.R. § 119.36(e) (2010) (FAA regulations requiring submission of recent
and projected financial data before the issuance of certification to start up operations as a
commercial air carrier). DOT also publishes its own financial requirements for starting up
an air carrier. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, HOW TO BECOME A CERTIFICATED AIR
CARRIER 17-21 (2005), available at
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/certific/Certificated%20packet2.pdf.
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foreign investment, particularly at times when domestic investment is
decreased by a domestic recession and the airline is unable to raise sufficient
capital. 86 Airlines have large capital needs that begin before the start of
operations and continue on a periodic basis throughout an airline's lifetime.87
As an industry, airlines have capital needs that have only grown over time.88
The most obvious start-up cost is the airline's aircraft, which, alongside the
multi-hundred million dollar investment if purchased outright,89 require spare
parts and equipment. Airlines often reduce the costs of acquiring aircraft
through leasing arrangements, 90 though leasing still requires significant
capital in the aggregate if an airline aspires to rapidly expand its fleet. Much
of these start-up costs are financed by debt, but airlines often seek equity
capital to start up and expand, especially during times of tight or expensive
credit.
JetBlue, as an example, was considered a well-capitalized airline at its
founding, drawing in $467 million of equity capital in its first four years of
operation. 91 The airline also had debt of $1.11 billion, with an additional
$6.58 billion secured for the purchase of equipment including 199 aircraft
over eight years. 92 Despite the significant capital secured during the airline's
inception, JetBlue's heavy reliance on debt financing was disadvantageous,
since the excessive debt could adversely affect the airline's ability to secure
future debt financing for expected expansions and the debt obligations could
divert cash from the airline's operations and generate significant costs from
interest rate fluctuations.93
Airlines require new aircraft to maintain and expand their route networks.
Fleet replacement and expansion is a continuous process. As airlines grow,
86 Patel, supra note 10, at 508.
87 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 69.
88 Patel, supra note 10, at 507 ("According to a 1990s study, the world's airlines
have capital needs of around $815 billion as compared to $147 billion ten years ago.")
(citing LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 70 n.39).
89 Aircraft, if purchased new, typically cost between $50 million and $300 million.
JetBlue's start-up aircraft, the Airbus A320, for example, averaged $76.9 million in 2008.
Airbus Aircraft Range of 2008 List Prices, AIRBUS SAS,
http://www.airbus.com/store/mm-repository/pdf/att00011726/mediaobject file ListPric
es2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
90 See Leslie Wayne, The Real Owner of All Those Planes, N.Y. TMES, May 10,
2007, at C1 ("Airlines lease airplanes for the same reason that cash-short consumers lease
cars-they can get new models for lower payments.").
91 JetBlue Airways Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter
JetBlue 2003 Annual Report], available at http://library.corporate-
ir.net/library/1 3/131/131045/items/211509/031 Okb.pdf.
92 Id. at 22.
93 Id.
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they require additional aircraft to increase flight frequencies on existing
routes and to open up new destinations within their networks. In 2003, for
example, JetBlue had firm orders for nearly 200 aircraft, to be delivered at a
rate of between nine and thirty aircraft per year.94 In contrast, airlines like
AirTran Airways deferred delivery of aircraft when capital was scarce due to
record high fuel costs. 95
At the same time, aircraft maintenance costs increase as aircraft age.
Acquiring new aircraft is a means for lowering maintenance costs. 9 6 Newer
aircraft also bring new advances in technology, which tend to lower
operating costs. Boeing's new 787 model, for example, is the first aircraft to
be made mostly of light-weight, composite materials, resulting in an
estimated 20% lower fuel bum over similarly sized existing models.97 An
airline looking to maintain a competitive edge would prefer to acquire new
aircraft, rather than operate a fleet of outdated, inefficient aircraft. Acquiring
this new fleet requires a substantial amount of capital.
Before an airline can even be competitive, it needs to be sure it can stay
afloat. The year 2008 was the start of trying times for the airline industry,
characterized by a number of rapid collapses of airlines both new and old.98
A common factor in all of their downfalls was an inability to maintain and
acquire new capital when faced with the financial losses of the rough
economic climate. The statements of airline officials and CEOs tell the story.
"We had been clear, since closing on our last round of financing, that we
would need additional capital. [I]nvestors believe in [Eos's] business
model ... [but] some issues arose that we could not overcome." 99 "[High oil
prices and a struggling economy] have impeded [Champion Air's] efforts to
attract new capital and new investors." 100 "[Aloha Airlines] said it ran out of
time to find a qualified buyer or secure continued financing for its passenger
94 1d. at 29.
95 Press Release, AirTran Airways, AirTran Airways Defers 18 Boeing Aircraft
Deliveries (May 30, 2008), available at
http://pressroom.airtran.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=201565&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1 152174.
96 See JetBlue 2003 Annual Report, supra note 91, at 23 ("Because the average age
of our aircraft is approximately 21 months, our aircraft require less maintenance now than
they will in the future.... Our maintenance costs will increase significantly, both on an
absolute basis and as a percentage of our operating expenses, as our fleet ages .... ").
97 Matt Molnar, Boeing 787 Dreamliner Finally Gets Off the Ground, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Dec. 15, 2009,
http://popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/news/4339887.
98 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
9 9 Eos, supra note 2.
100 Walsh, supra note 3 (quoting Champion Air CEO Lee Steele).
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business." 10' "[ATA's] top management began looking for other capital or,
short of that, ways to sell the 35-year-old airline as a going concern, but
could neither consummate a sale nor find other cash, forcing this morning's
shut down."102
In sum, even the most efficient or innovative airlines require large
amounts of capital. Without adequate access to this capital, the existing
players cannot expand or improve their existing services, and new entrants
do not have access to the market. In a worst-case scenario, airlines, even
those with a strong capitalization, may not be able to sustain the losses
brought about by an extended economic contraction. The end of cash
signifies the end of an airline.
B. The Risks: Passenger Safety and Security
Safety with regard to aircraft airworthiness and airline operations is one
concern of foreign ownership. A noted risk is that foreign-owned airlines
may not operate in accordance with the same standards of safety that airlines
in the U.S. do. 10 3 Lelieur describes the concern about safety thusly: "[I]f a
carrier is owned by nationals who are not citizens of the designating country,
it may be difficult to demonstrate the designating government's continuing
competence in the technical aspects of airline and aircraft certification."']0 4
Despite this possibility, concerns about safety can be adequately addressed
through existing bilateral agreements and operating certification procedures.
If a foreign carrier did not meet international safety standards, the U.S.
could revoke the carrier's operating certificate in the U.S., thereby barring
U.S.-bound flights on that particular carrier or all flights from the respective
foreign country. More commonly, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) can impose restrictions on foreign carrier services to the U.S. based
on concerns about safety. For example, in 2008 the FAA downgraded Israel's
safety ranking from Category I to Category II, 10 5 meaning that Israeli air
carriers would be unable to expand existing service to the U.S. either through
additional aircraft or flights.10 6 The FAA scrutinized a number of factors,
including lack of safety oversight and Israel's crowded air space. 10 7 Korean
Air suffered the same fate in the 1990s after a decades-long string of fatal
crashes. 10 8 The category downgrade not only affected Korean Air, but it also
affected Asiana Airlines, another international airline based in South
Korea.109 The fact that foreign airlines operating to the U.S. can be held to
international safety standards suggests that U.S. carriers, even those owned
101 Segal, supra note 5.
102 Jim Mathews, ATA Airlines Shuts Down, AVIATION WEEK, Apr. 3, 2008,
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story channel.j sp?channel=comm&id=news/A
TA04038.xml.
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by foreign entities, would be subject to the same standards as well.
Additionally, the country in which an air carrier's aircraft are registered is
recognized as responsible for aircraft airworthiness, which highlights the
level of control the U.S. will maintain over its carriers, both U.S. and foreign
owned.' 10
C. The Risks: A Loss of American Jobs
A large constituency that has predominantly opposed the liberalization of
foreign ownership restrictions has been airline employees.11' When foreign
103 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN CODE-
SHARE SAFETY PROGRAM SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 1 (2005) (analyzing the impact on
aviation safety of international code-share agreements, citing concerns raised following
the crash of a foreign airliner operating a code-share flight for a U.S. carrier).
104 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 64; see also Patel, supra note 10, at 520 (citing
LELIEUR) ("Lelieur argues that because a clause exists in model bilateral agreements that
allows a country to withdraw a carrier's operating permit if it fails to comply with
international safety standards, aviation safety would not be endangered by further
liberalization and relaxation of ownership restrictions.").
105 Andy Pasztor, IAA May Lower Isreal's Safety Rank, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008,
at D3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122836333376578741.html. These
safety ratings are part of the International Aviation Safety Assessments Program created
by the Federal Aviation Administration. International Aviation Safety Assessments
(1ASA) Program, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). The program
assess a foreign country's ability to adhere to internationally accepted safety standards.
Id. For an overview of the two-category system, see JASA Results Definitions, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa/definitions/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2011).
106 Zohar Blumenkrantz, U.S. FAA Downgrades Israel's Aviation Safety Ranking,
HAARETZ, Nov. 20, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1038947.html.
107 Id.; see also Pasztor, supra note 105..3
108 Don Kirk, New Standards Mean Korean Air Is Coming off Many 'Shun' Lists,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/26/business/new-
standards-mean-korean-air-is-coming-off-many-shun-lists.html.
109 Id. The FAA most recently downgraded Mexico to Category 2, meaning that
Mexican carriers could continue to operate or adjust frequencies on existing authorized
services to the U.S., provided that the carriers' total capacity to the U.S. does not
increase. Brendan Sobie, Aeromexico Increases Capacity on Several U.S. Routes, AIR
TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE NEWS, Oct. 27, 2010,
http://flightglobal.com/articles/2010/10/27/349020/aeromexico-increases-capacity-on-
several -us-routes.html.
110 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 64.
Il1 See, e.g., Letter from Edward Wytkind, President, AFL-CIO Transp. Trades
Dep't (TTD), to Don Young, Chairman, House Transp. & Infrastructure Comm., and
James Oberstar, Ranking Democrat, House Transp. and Infrastructure Comm. (Nov. 2,
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investors or air carriers purchase U.S. airlines, the fear is that they will begin
to replace American employees with foreign ones.1 12 A related fear is that a
foreign carrier may purchase a U.S. carrier to gain access to the latter's U.S.
domestic network in an effort to feed passengers to the foreign carrier's
international routes from the U.S. 113 In such a scenario, the foreign carrier
would likely discontinue the U.S. carrier's international routes so that it
could operate the routes itself. U.S. employees would be shut out of more
highly salaried international service positions. 114 Indeed, the British Airways-
US Air deal did seem to limit US Air's international services to two cities-
Paris and Frankfurt 15-but after the conclusion of the agreement US Air
aggressively expanded its international operations from its Philadelphia
hub.116
Proponents of liberalization often counter that, during times of intense
economic distress and significant layoffs in the airline industry, foreign
investment would provide a needed lifeline to sustain the airlines and curb
the job losses. 117 Other proponents argue that U.S. airlines in close
arrangements with foreign carriers would be unlikely to cut their
international services because such services are usually the most lucrative of
their route networks. 118 While profits on domestic operations for U.S.
carriers are squeezed by the presence of low-fare carriers, international
operations have been a haven for the legacy carriers to operate free of most
low-fare competition. 119
2005), available at http://www.ttd.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC={2E972A88-C3BB-
43B7-9D07-52BDEA6D8COE} (follow "Oppose Changing Statutory Rules Limiting
Foreign Ownership of U.S. Airlines: Letter to the House" hyperlink) (voicing opposition
on behalf of the AFL-CIO TTD to the Bush Administration's proposal to liberalize
ownership restrictions in airlines).
112 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 65.
113 Patel, supra note 10, at 514.
114 Id
115 See USAir Route System, USAIR MAGAZINE, May 1996, at 94, 94-95. The May
1996 issue of USAir Magazine also included a global route map for its partner British
Airways. Id. at 96-97.
116 See USAirways Route System, US AIRWAYS, April 1997, at 94, 94-95. The April
1997 issue of US Airways' magazine did not include a British Airways route map as the
May 1996 issue did. Within the one year period since May 1996, US Air ended its
agreement with British Airways, changed its name to US Airways, and added three cities
to its transatlantic network: Munich, Rome, and Madrid. Id.
117 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 66.
118 See Patel, supra note 10, at 514.
119 David Bond, Stymied by Domestic Fares, U.S. Carriers Think International,
AVIATION WEEK, Oct. 9, 2005,
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id-news/l 01
05pO .xml.
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To some extent, the arguments on both sides of the issue are valid.
Airlines will likely cut jobs or stymie job growth on international routes if
foreign carriers invest in U.S. carriers. On the other hand, international routes
are many legacy airlines' bread and butter. Nevertheless, the fact of the
matter is airlines will, and have, cut services and jobs on their international
sectors already without any relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions, and
they have done so through code-share agreements with foreign carriers. 120
Instead of operating an international route, a U.S. airline can put its code on a
foreign carrier's flight, thereby profiting off an international flight that the
U.S. airline does not operate. 121
With the existence of the current U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement and
international airline alliances across the Atlantic, increased transatlantic
competition may have slightly diminished the profitability of these routes,
making a code-share arrangement or low-risk joint venture more appealing.
While some scholars have noted that U.S. airlines would not give up their
international routes, 122 some airlines have found ways to profit off of
international routes without expending most of the cost of operating such
routes. United Airlines recently took advantage of Open Skies to contract
with Aer Lingus, the flag carrier of Ireland, to operate flights from United's
hub in Washington Dulles International Airport to Barajas Airport in
Madrid. 123 Flights began operating with Aer Lingus equipment and cockpit
crew in March 2010.124 United Airlines employees were, at the very least,
120 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 19 ("[C]arriers most frequently cooperate through
'code-sharing,' whereby airlines place their code on the flights of another carrier, sell the
service as their own.").
121 Id.
122 See Patel, supra note 10, at 515 ("[T]here are essentially two ways in which
international service could be contracted: (1) if a foreign-owned company starts up a U.S.
subsidiary or buys a U.S. carrier; and (2) if a code-sharing partner, such as Lufthansa,
replaces a U.S. carrier such as United, on long haul routes .... With respect to the second
possibility of code sharing and transferring international routes to the foreign carrier
(such as the case where United and Lufthansa would agree that Lufthansa would operate
all long haul services), international service is simply too profitable to logically see a
domestic U.S. carrier willing to cede its long haul operations to a foreign code sharing
partner.").
123 Press Release, United Airlines Press Office, Aer Lingus and United Airlines
Announce Transatlantic Partnership (Jan. 22, 2009) available at
http://www.united.com/press/detail/0,7056,60202-1,00.html.
124 Id. While the cockpit would be staffed by Aer Lingus pilots, a third party
contractor hired cabin crew specifically for the new route. Julie Johnsson, UnitedAirlines
Unions Protest Aer Lingus Venture, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2010, at 1.
[Vol. 72:1l
NA VIGA TING THE COMPLEX SKIES
irritated by this agreement, as they believed the route could be operated with
United's own aircraft and employees. 125
Even prior to the United-Aer Lingus agreement, Northwest and KLM-
and now Delta, 126 KLM, and Air France-have jointly operated flights
between European hubs and cities in the U.S., alternating equipment and
crew as the airlines have seen fit. Generally the switches are made to take
advantage of an aircraft type that is better suited to a particular route, but a
type that is only available to one airline in the partnership and not the other.
For example, Air France used to operate wide-bodied, higher capacity
aircraft into Philadelphia International Airport from its hub at Paris Charles
De Gaulle International Airport. Due to decreasing demand requiring a
decrease in aircraft size, Delta took over the route using its narrow-bodied
Boeing 757s, an aircraft type that Air France does not operate. 127 In this
scenario, the American airline employee gains a flight; however, there are
plenty of potential scenarios in which the same employee could lose work as
well. Delta, for example, could operate a route with a Boeing 747, the largest
in its fleet, to a slot-restricted airport, 128 and when the demands on the route
exceed the capacity of the aircraft, Air France may have to take over the
flight with its higher capacity Airbus A380s, an aircraft which neither Delta
nor any U.S. carrier operates.
In some sense, the damage that airline employees fear from liberalization
of the foreign ownership restrictions has already taken place with Open Skies
125 United Airlines Seems Determined to Piss off Employees, O'Leary Tees Off on
News, PLANEBUZZ, (Jan. 23, 2009, 12:46 PM),
http://www.planebuzz.com/2009/01/united-airlinesseemsdetermin.html.
126 Delta Air Lines recently acquired Northwest Airlines and now operates under
one operating certificate. Marilyn Adams and Dan Reed, World's Largest Airline: Delta,
Northwest in Merger Deal, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2008-04-14-delta-northwest-mergeN.htm.
127 Press Release, Air France, Air France KLM 2009 Winter Schedule (Sept. 21,
2009), http://corporate.airfrance.com/en/press/press-releases/ (browse through the pages
until press releases for "Monday 21 September 2009" are displayed; then follow "Air
France KLM 2009 Winter Schedule" hyperlink under the September 21 date). Air France
does not deploy aircraft with capacity and operational characteristics similar to those of
the Boeing 757 on transatlantic (long-haul) routes. See Key Figures, AiR FRANCE,
http://corporate.airfrance.com/en/fleet/long-haul-fleet/key-figures/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2011).
128 Airports are often slot-restricted when heavy congestion in aircraft movements
outstrips the capacity of the airport's limited number of runways. See Michael E. Levine,
Airport Congestion: When Theory Meets Reality, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 43-44 (2009)
(discussing airport congestion at airports with significant operations by more than one
carrier and the need for slots or congestion pricing). Because airlines do not have the
flexibility to increase the number of flights at such airports, they are forced to expand
capacity through larger aircraft.
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and global airline alliances. Allowing foreign investment in U.S. carriers
would seem to do no more harm than has already been done, from the point
of view of the airline employee.
D. The Risks: Inadequate Aircraft for National Defense
1. Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program
With regard to national security, the primary concern for not loosening
the investment restrictions has traditionally been the preservation of the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, coordinated by the Department of
Defense (DOD). In CRAF, U.S. airlines are incentivized to transport U.S.
personnel and cargo overseas on behalf of the U.S. government during times
of war. 129 By some accounts, airline participation accounts for up to half of
the U.S. military's airlift capability during wartime, while the military saves
cost on purchasing, maintaining, and staffing additional military aircraft
throughout peacetime.1 30 The incentives to airlines are multifold. For one,
airlines have traditionally experienced lower passenger numbers during
wartime, and the excess aircraft capacity available to them is better utilized
while under the service of the U.S. government. 131 The second benefit is that
airlines that choose to participate in the program are offered the opportunity
to support the military's charter needs during peacetime, another potentially
lucrative deal for the participating U.S. airlines. 132 For the most part airlines
participate in this program because it simply makes good business sense.
Currently CRAF requires participants to be U.S. carriers certified by the
FAA. 133 As of 2007, membership included 37 carriers and over 1,300
129 Patel, supra note 10, at 520.
130 CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. RL33692, CIVIL
RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF) 4 (2006).
131 See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES, INDUSTRY STUDIES 2002:
TRANSPORTATION 19 (2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA425298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (noting how the
September 11 th attacks resulted in excess aircraft capacity for U.S. airlines, capacity
which went toward military uses in Afghanistan).
132 GAO 1992, supra note 14, at 15; see also INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES,
ECLAT CONSULTING, GRA, MORTEN, BEYER & AGNEW, SUSTAINING THE CIVIL AIR
RESERVE FLEET (CRAF) PROGRAM 1 (2003) [hereinafter IDA CRAF Study], available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/tp/new airlift_policies/craf studyfinal_%20mayl 2003.pdf
(finding the peacetime military charter business to total $2 billion annually during the
early 2000s).
133 BOLKCOM, supra note 130, at 1.
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aircraft. 134 Based on the varying capabilities of their aircraft, CRAF carriers
are enlisted on any of three main mission segments: the international segment
(long and short range), the national segment (sections for the continental U.S.
and Alaska), and aeromedical evacuation. 135 Out of these segments, carriers
provide the most support by far for CRAF's international operations, 136
suggesting that DOD's wartime operations abroad would be the most
impacted should CRAF participation diminish. To date, CRAF has only been
activated formally twice in its 54-year history: once during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm in 1990-91, and once during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the
first half of 2003.137 In both instances, the government activated CRAF's
long range international operations, though cargo was not required for Iraqi
Freedom. 138
Opponents of liberalizing foreign ownership restrictions argue that the
government will have fewer options in ensuring that CRAF has adequate
support for its wartime initiatives, once foreign companies gain control of
U.S. airlines. 139 U.S. airlines presently have a strong financial incentive not
only to participate in CRAF, but also to fulfill their CRAF obligations if the
program were to be activated. 140 As a result, the concern over foreign
ownership does not rest solely on whether a foreign-controlled airline will
participate in CRAF, but whether the airline will come through on its
obligations. With U.S. airlines, the government has the power to threaten to
revoke an airline's operating certificate (causing it to cease operations
altogether) or threaten litigation upon company officers and directors, if
noncompliance causes CRAF participation to fall below military
requirements. 141 Foreign-owned airlines, particularly those controlled by
134 Factsheets: Civil Air Reserve Fleet, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id-1 73 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010)
[hereinafter USAF CRAF Factsheet]. In 2006, all major passenger and cargo carriers
participated in CRAF, suggesting the carriers financially benefited from the program.
BOLKCOM, supra note 130, at 8. At the time, the major passenger carriers were United,
American, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, and Southwest Airlines, and the major cargo
carriers were UPS and FEDEX. Id. at 8 n. 17.
135 Id. at 1.
136 USAF CRAF Factsheet, supra note 134.
137 BOLKCOM, supra note 130, at 3.
13 8 Id.
139 See Patel, supra note 10, at 521 (noting that the U.S. government has less
leverage over foreign carriers should one fail to fulfill CRAF obligations). But see
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES, supra note 131, at 17-19 (suggesting that
DOD should supplement existing airlift needs using foreign carriers, particularly those
allied with U.S. carriers).
140 IDA CRAF Study, supra note 132, at 39.
141 Patel, supra note 10, at 521.
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foreign governments, could be at odds with U.S. foreign policy, and if they
exerted control over U.S. carriers necessary for the success of CRAF, they
could frustrate the U.S. government's military objectives abroad, even when
non-participation in CRAF were financially damaging to the airline. For this
reason, both proponents and opponents of liberalization have voiced a need
for the U.S. government to exert sizeable influence over airlines controlled
by foreign or domestic entities. 142
2. Dangers of Foreign Government Control and Interference
The CRAF program is most vulnerable if foreign government-controlled
entities, or foreign governments themselves, purchase U.S. airlines. Prior to
the 1990s, government ownership and control of national airlines was the
norm in the international aviation environment. 143 Foreign governments,
compelled by concerns of nationalism and competition from the air carriers
of other countries, sought to maintain control of national airlines to sustain
them and promote national economic goals. 144 As the international airline
industry matured, state-ownership of flag carriers began to wane in
popularity, giving way to the industry's liberalization as a whole-complete
with healthy competition by privately-owned airlines. 145 The result of
widespread privatizations has been an industry where many national flag
carriers are partially owned, but not controlled, by their home
governments.' 46 Nevertheless, many countries, both economically developed
and lesser developed, still hold controlling interests in their home carriers to
this day for various reasons.1 47
The state control of these foreign airlines raises questions about the
possibility that, should foreign ownership restrictions in U.S. airlines loosen,
foreign governments could have influence over whether a U.S. airline
participates in CRAF. The distinctions between private and public
142 See, e.g., Patel, supra note 10, at 521-22.
143 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 3.
144 See ZYLICZ, supra note 62, at 23 ("The usual attitude of states that have small or
medium size airlines which are not strong enough to stand the competition from foreign,
more powerful companies, is to protect their national airlines through various modes of
regulation and restriction... rather than to expose them to risk of possible failure."). This
same rationale can be used to explain the traditional desire for many countries with
vulnerable national airlines to control a nation's flag carrier and protect it from failure.
145 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 75.
146 Id.
147 See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
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corporations 148 -that is, state-owned and state-controlled corporations-
strike at the core of this issue. Both private and public corporations have
differing constituent groups to whom they must answer. 149 Private
corporations answer to shareholders while public corporations often answer
to a government's electorate. 150
Shareholders of private corporations have a primary interest in
maximizing the long term value of their shares, an interest which demands
strong corporate profits. In other words, a corporation "must have the making
of money as its primary goal. If it fails to thrive financially, the private
corporation faces ruin."151 Managers of private corporations are first and
foremost answerable to their shareholders, 152 which places a burden on the
managers to make corporate decisions that will profit the corporation. In the
context of U.S. airline ownership, foreign airlines owned by private investors
are far more likely to voluntarily participate in CRAF than are those run by
governments because participation results in profit. If a foreign airline gained
control of a U.S. airline, the financial benefits of participation in CRAF
would likely outweigh any potential downside. 153
An independent-minded manager could decide not to participate in
CRAF, but she would face potential removal from office if shareholders
strongly disapproved of the decision. Along a similar line, independent-
minded investors may choose not to allow their airline to participate in
CRAF against any reasonable business judgment. 154 Such independent-
minded investors would not be unique to foreign countries, however. U.S.
investors could still impose the same poor business decisions on an airline
for their own personal reasons. It is not unreasonable to imagine a wealthy
American mogul vocally opposing U.S. military intervention while in control
148 In the context of this Note, "public" refers to a corporation that is state-owned or
state-controlled. This is distinguishable from a publicly traded company that is private in
nature but owned by investors trading on a public exchange.
149 Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body
Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 41, 59 (1995).
150 Id. at 59 n.115.
151 Id. at 59.
152 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. and Christopher W. Frost, Managers' Fiduciary
Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32
J. CORP. L. 491,495-97 (2007).
153 See supra notes 129, 131-33 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
airlines naturally benefit from participation in CRAF.
154 See Patel, supra note 10, at 522 (noting the possibility that a foreign investor
could choose not to participate in CRAF for independent reasons).
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of a U.S. airline. Ted Turner, for example, has voiced his distaste for war,155
and it would be possible that an airline in his hands would not participate in
CRAF. In the end, the threat that an investor would prevent a U.S. airline
from participating in CRAF exists regardless of the nationality of the investor.
Despite this fact, private investment from foreign or domestic sources will
still tend to favor participation in CRAF.
Public corporations, on the other hand, have responsibilities that "go
beyond the desire for monetary gain." 156 The managers of public
corporations are often held accountable to the government, which in turn is
accountable to the electorate. If a public corporation does not align its actions
with the will of the general public, the government owners may suffer
politically. For this reason, the governments of democratic countries have the
potential to be influenced by political considerations when exerting control
over public corporations.1 57 A state-owned foreign airline would pose risks to
CRAF that a privately held airline would not. The foreign government
owning the foreign airline may feel pressured by its electorate into not aiding
the U.S. in its wartime efforts. Public opposition to a U.S.-led war could
influence a foreign government to ensure that a U.S. airline it indirectly
controls will refuse to participate in the CRAF program.
On top of political considerations, foreign governments are
fundamentally responsible for protecting their nations' security interests. In
the unlikely scenario that the U.S. government were to go to war with a
foreign country whose government exerts control over a U.S. airline, or with
an ally thereof, the purposes of CRAF would again be undermined. In the
past, an extreme scenario such as this would have likely been cause for the
U.S. government to seize the U.S.-registered aircraft indirectly controlled by
foreign carriers through the Defense Production Act. 158 Today, a possible
safeguard against this remote scenario would come from the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which authorizes the
Executive Branch to approve or investigate the national security implications
of a pending transaction involving a foreign investor. 159 Additionally, as an
155 Interview by Jesse Kombluth, Reader's Digest, with Ted Turner (Nov. 21,
2008), in READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 2008, at 27 ("War with Iran wouldn't be fun. War with
Russia would be catastrophic. War is no longer any kind of answer.").
156 Mays, supra note 149, at 60.
157 See id. (discussing how municipal corporations have political responsibilities).
158 Patel, supra note 10, at 521 (discussing the Defense Production Act of 1950,
Pub.L. No. 81-774, § 201, 64 Stat. 799-800 (1950) (codified under 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061
et seq. (2006) and repealed Sept. 30, 2009)). The Act authorized the President to
condemn property to aid national defense. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2081 (2006), repealed by the
Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2009, Pub.L. No. 111-67, § 2(a)(2), 123 Stat.
2006, 2007 (Sept. 30, 2009).
159 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).
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enforcement mechanism for any carrier that volunteers to participate in
CRAF but wavers in meeting its commitments, DOT could revoke a carrier's
operating certificate. 160 Requiring CRAF participation before any
certification is granted, however, poses a potential downside: the requirement
could, in effect, deter foreign investors from investing in U.S. carriers from
the outset, which would likely undo the benefits of liberalizing ownership
restrictions. Many also believe that such a requirement would be unduly
restrictive on airlines, particularly when free market principles encourage
maximum free choice in commercial decisions. 161
In 2005, DOT proposed a rule to partially liberalize foreign ownership
restrictions while guarding against the national security risks of foreign
involvement in CRAF. 162 In particular, DOT proposed that its interpretation
of "actual control" by U.S. citizens should be narrowed to those aspects of an
airline's operations that affect national security concerns and participation in
CRAF. 163 Essentially, foreign investors would have more freedom to control
the purely commercial aspects of an airline's operations, but the airline
would have to designate U.S. citizens to carry out its decisions with regard to
CRAF participation. This arrangement could have proven problematic, since,
for example, it did not seem realistic to expect a subordinate committee of
U.S. citizens to be fully independent of a foreign-controlled airline board.
With multiple parties expressing views on both sides of the proposed rule,
DOT withdrew its proposal, citing its "controversial" nature as a reason to
delay any rulemaking until further public discussion on the issue could take
place. ' 64
Apart from the national security implications, another potential problem
involving government interference is the fact that foreign governments often
subsidize the operations of their nation's carriers, whether as a response to
government ownership of the carrier or as a means of saving a national
airline during a time of crisis. Government subsidies often have a damaging
effect on both airlines themselves and on competition generally. On the one
hand, airlines which are supported by their governments may operate
160 Josh Cavinato, Note, Turbulence in the Airline Industry: Rethinking America's
Foreign Ownership Restrictions, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 311,331 (2008).
161 See, e.g., Patel, supra note 10, at 522.
162 Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389, 67,393 (proposed Nov.
7, 2005).
163 Id. at 67,394. The proposed rule restricted the possibility of increased foreign
investment to countries that had Open Skies agreements with the U.S. and with which the
U.S. had reciprocal investment benefits. Id.
164 Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,106, 71,108-09 (Dec. 8,
2006).
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inefficiently due to a lack of incentive to operate profitably. 165 The result is
lower productivity accompanied by higher operating costs, which have a
detrimental effect on the consumer by way of higher prices. 166
On the other hand, airlines may be able to unfairly use their government
subsidies to undercut competition from foreign carriers. 167 In one possible
scenario, an airline that is not concerned about profitability theoretically
could be able to charge any fare it wants, no matter how low. This would
disadvantage carriers who could not afford to charge fares as low, and they
would be driven out of the market. As it relates to foreign ownership in U.S.
airlines, a foreign government that subsidizes its national airline would, in
effect, be subsidizing the U.S. airline that the foreign airline controls. If that
U.S. airline no longer felt the pressure to charge a profitable fare, it would
unfairly harm the domestic business of other U.S. airlines that were not
controlled by a foreign entity.168 The market would tilt in favor of foreign-
owned U.S. airlines subsidized by foreign governments.
Governments in both the United States and abroad have succumbed to
pressure to subsidize national carriers at various times in the recent past. For
example, though barred by the Maastricht Treaty from aiding their
carriers, 169 EU governments during the 1990s supported their home nation
carriers in Spain, France, and Greece. 170 This aid essentially constituted bail-
out packages to keep ailing national airlines from failing. 171 The U.S.
government subsidized one of its own carriers following the September 11,
165 Jason S. Kelley, Privatization of Transportation in Developed Nations, 48
ADMIN. L. REv. 545, 551 (1996).
1661Id.
167 LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 75 ("[T]he airlines, constantly provided with
government subsidies, may be more tempted to offer lower prices to consumers than
private carriers would be, and, consequently, they would dominate the market.").
168 See Kirsten B6hmann, The Ownership and Control Requirement in US. and
European Union Air Law and U.S. Maritime Law-Policy; Consideration; Comparison,
66 J. Am L. & COM. 689, 697 (2001) ("The statutory requirement of U.S. citizenship was
intended to prevent a [heavily subsidized,] state-owned carrier from buying a U.S. carrier
and competing unfairly in the U.S. domestic market to the detriment of other U.S.
carriers.").
169 The current iteration of the treaty exists as Treaty on European Union and Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1. "[A]ny aid
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be
incompatible with the internal market." Id. art. 107(1).
170 Kelley, supra note 165, at 553. Specifically, the Spanish government gave Iberia
Airlines a $945 million aid package in 1992; France gave Air France a $3.8 billion aid
package in 1994; Greece gave Olympic Airlines a $2.3 billion aid package in 1994. Id.
171 Id.
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2001 attacks, bailing out America West Airlines in December 2001.172 The
government's Air Transportation Stabilization Board accepted a request to
guarantee loans of nearly $380 million to America West Airlines, receiving
warrants representing 5.3% of the airline's common stock, although the
government would not be entitled to voting rights. 173
Despite the general trend toward privatization, the risk of some foreign
airlines becoming public or nationalized still exists, though it does appear
somewhat remote. Countries that are concerned about the state of their home
carriers, for example, may be tempted to take ownership or control of their
struggling carriers to prevent the collapse of the airline's operations. As
stated above, the U.S. government invested heavily in America West Airlines
after the September 1 1th attacks to prevent the airline's collapse.174 In the
case of Bahrain's Gulf Air, the state's sovereign wealth fund, Mumtalakat,
ceded direct control of Gulf Air to the state because of the airline's perceived
lower rate of return. 175 Another possibility exists that a leader of government,
for ideological or political reasons, might nationalize private assets, including
the national airlines.
IV. A CAUTIOUS SOLUTION: LIBERALIZING RESTRICTIONS WITH
CONTINUED VIGILANCE
Among scholarly opinion, liberalization of foreign investment
restrictions is the commonly accepted policy goal, particularly in the wake of
a turbulent decade in the airline industry. 176 Having dispelled many
172 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMERCIAL AVIATION: FINANCIAL CONDITION
AND INDUSTRY RESPONSES AFFECT COMPETITION 5 n.8 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0317lt.pdf ("The Board approved a loan of $429 million
to America West Airlines.").
173 Letter from Roger Kodat, Acting Executive Dir., Air Transp. Stabilization Bd.,
to W. Douglas Parker, Chairman, President, Chief Executive Officer, Am. W. Airlines
(Dec. 28, 2001) (on file with author). America West Airlines acquired US Airways (and
adopted its name) in September 2005, retaining W. Douglas Parker as CEO of the new
US Airways. See US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2005).
174 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
175 Frederik Richter, Bahrain SWF Moves Gulf Air Ownership to Govt, REUTERS
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE6132TC20100204. Note,
however, that this situation involved a carrier that was already indirectly controlled by the
state; Gulf Air simply became directly controlled by the state after this divestiture. Actual
privatization was still on the table. Id.
176 See, e.g., LELIEUR, supra note 24, at 17; Patel, supra note 10, at 488; see also
Carlos Grau Tanner, New Proposals to Break the Foreign Ownership Deadlock in the
Airline Industry, 34 AIR & SPACE L. (vol. 2) 127, 127-34 (2009); Christopher McBay,
Note, Airline Deregulation Deserves Another Shot: How Foreign Investment Restrictions
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arguments against the removal of those restrictions, the issue of national
defense and CRAF still remains on the table. Tearing down the wall of
foreign ownership restrictions in one swoop could potentially prove onerous
to CRAF, for example, if there is no continued oversight of changes in U.S.
airline ownership. 177 For this reason, this Note argues that liberalization
should first be specifically tailored to EU nations, and that DOT should
continue to review U.S. airlines for ownership and control requirements,
particularly when a change in ownership places airline control in the hands of
foreign entities from countries not signatories to any Open Skies agreement
with the U.S., or when the foreign entity is controlled by a foreign
government. 17 8
A. Foreign Investment Restrictions Should Be Relaxed to EU Entities
The U.S.'s Open Skies agreement with the EU presents a unique
opportunity for the U.S. to loosen its foreign investment restrictions.
Although there remain several challenges with regard to government
interference and control in particular EU member states, allowing EU entities
to provide capital to U.S. airlines in exchange for some increased control is
potentially the safest and most beneficial way for U.S. airlines to raise capital
from foreign sources while addressing concerns about national defense and
CRAF participation.
First, the Open Skies agreement between the U.S. and EU allows U.S.
carriers to commercially operate any route between the U.S. and Europe, as
well as intra-European routes, 179 a benefit whose magnitude is unmatched by
other Open Skies agreements. This benefit was under threat prior to the
second stage agreement in June 2010; relaxation of U.S. foreign ownership
restrictions was a key issue for resolution during second stage talks, though
no significant changes resulted. 180 Second, the U.S. and EU agreement
includes a clear commitment of minimizing government interference and
subsidies in the respective airlines of both communities. Such aspirational
language exists in nearly all Open Skies agreements that the U.S. has
and Subsidies Actually Hurt the Airline Industry, 72 J. AiR L. & COM. 173, 173-74
(2007).
177 See, e.g., Cavinato, supra note 160, at 337 ("In order to address national security
concerns, such as protecting the viability of the CRAF, the law should not lift the
restriction entirely, but rather should incorporate certain conditions on foreign ownership
and control.").
178 See IDA CRAF Study, supra note 132, at 47-50 (proposing that DOD assess the
national security implications of any change in U.S. airline ownership).
179 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
180 See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
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signed. 181 The U.S.-EU agreement, however, not only provides more direct
language on the issue of subsidies, but the airline industry in the EU has
shown more steady progress toward airline privatization than in most parts of
the globe. 182 Third, nationalism in EU airlines is not as dominant a force as it
once was with regard to airline ownership in the EU. Various EU airlines are
no longer owned by citizens of their respective member states, but rather by
airlines from other EU member states besides their own. 183 As EU members
become more comfortable with these arrangements and less protective of
their national carriers, the likelihood of government intervention decreases.
And fourth, most EU states are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), a mutual defense pact. Foreign airlines based in
NATO countries are less likely to subvert participation in CRAF, even if they
are controlled by their home governments.
1. The Specific Benefits of the U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement
The U.S.'s treatment of foreign investment restrictions has the potential
to impact the continued success of the U.S.-EU Open Skies liberalization
process. The 2007 agreement required "second stage negotiations" centered
on a handful of priorities, one of the more contentious being the issue of
"additional foreign investment opportunities.' ' 184 Prior to the signing of the
second stage agreement, the parties had a right to suspend all of the rights
provided in the agreement if the second stage negotiations failed by a
particular date. 185 The second stage provision was a requirement inserted by
EU negotiators, to whom it was apparent that the initial Open Skies deal
favored U.S. interests over EU interests.186 For example, U.S. airlines were
given the right to fly commercially between two points in different EU
member states while EU airlines could not do the same between two U.S.
states, nor could EU carriers sufficiently invest in U.S. airlines to acquire the
same rights. 187 Additionally, the agreement opened up London's Heathrow
181 See infra text accompanying notes 200-03.
182 See infra Part IV.A.2.
183 See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
184 U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 77, art. 21(2)(b).
185 Id. art. 21(3).
186 See The Aeropolitics of the Oneworld Order, AVIATION LAW PROF BLOG (Feb.
15, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/aviation/2010/02/the-aeropolitics-of-the-
oneworld-order.html [hereinafter Aeropolitics]; see also ASS'N OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES,
OPEN SKIES: THE EU-US AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT 2-3 (Apr. 2, 2008), available at
http://files.aea.be/News/News020408.pdf (listing the agreement's imbalances favoring
U.S. airlines).
187 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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Airport to all U.S. carriers, a right the United Kingdom seemingly gave up
without increased investment rights in return. 188
The second stage agreement eliminated a timetable for continued
talks,' 89 allowing the issue of foreign investment restrictions to fade into the
background. Although the agreement no longer mandates discussion
regarding investment restrictions, the overall agreement still operates on a
provisional basis.' 90 Other Open Skies agreements vest in parties the right to
terminate the agreement at any time. 191
188 Aeropolitics, supra note 186. Access to Heathrow prior to the agreement was
limited to two U.S. carriers. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
189 U.S.-EU Amended Agreement, supra note 82, art. 6 (deleting the original
agreement's Article 21, which provided for second stage talks and the right to suspend
the agreement). Instead the amendment replaces second stage talks with "Further
Expansion of Opportunities," where, if the parties meet certain conditions, each side can
receive some additional traffic rights. Id. These rights involve seventh freedom rights-in
the U.S.'s case, the right to operate a standalone flight between the EU and any of five
non-EU countries without requiring the flight to originate or terminate in the U.S. Id. art.
6 (amended art. 21(3)(b)). The rights may likely prove useless for two reasons: first, the
rights are conditioned upon the U.S. allowing EU entities to take ownership or control of
U.S. airlines, a right that is reciprocated by the EU allowing U.S. investors to take control
of EU airlines. Id. art. 6 (amended art. 21(2)). If that were to occur, U.S. airlines would
likely prefer to invest in an EU airline to gain access to EU-third party routes, rather than
operating the routes themselves and being subject to the limitations of the amended
agreement. Second, seventh freedom access to a third party may require additional
negotiation in the future, since current bilateral agreements tend to restrict the negotiated
access benefits to airlines controlled by parties to the bilateral agreement-so-called
"nationality clauses." See The Nationality Clause Lives, AvIATION LAW PROF BLOG (Mar.
2, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/aviation/2010/03/the-nationality-clause-
lives.html. As such, a U.S. airline could not operate a route from London to Cairo, for
example, if the EU-Egypt bilateral agreement only provided traffic rights to airlines of
the EU or Egypt. Even without a nationality clause, liberal Open Skies agreements tend
to only provide fifth freedom rights-for example, the right for a U.S. carrier to fly from
the U.S. to the EU and then continue to a third country. See, e.g., Air Transport
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Albania, U.S.-Alb., Annex 1 § 1, Sept. 24, 2003,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/114547.pdf (requiring a U.S.
point of origin for flights continuing from Albania to a third country). If the U.S. had
negotiated for only fifth freedom rights with the third country, these fifth freedom rights
with the third country would make seventh freedom rights with the EU meaningless since
the former requires a U.S. origination or termination point.
190 U.S.-EU Amended Agreement, supra note 82, art. 9.
191 See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates, U.S.-U.A.E., art. 15,
Mar. 11, 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ I 4606.pdf.
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Because U.S. and EU airlines have instituted a number of business
decisions in reliance on this agreement, 192 it seems unlikely that Open Skies
rights between the U.S. and EU would suddenly be revoked. 193 Nevertheless,
given the complexity of the U.S.-EU agreement and the many countries
involved, any revocation could mean a loss of very beneficial rights to U.S.
carriers. 194 Because the benefits that U.S. airlines receive from the U.S.-EU
Open Skies agreement are so significant, any liberalization of U.S. foreign
ownership restrictions should be directed at the EU. 195 The same benefits-
namely, unrestricted U.S. carrier access to the same breadth of markets
offered by the European community-are not available through the other
Open Skies agreements currently signed by the U.S. The ability for U.S.
carriers to offer unrestricted intra-European services is also an added benefit
that other Open Skies agreements 196 with single nations typically do not offer.
A U.S. agreement with a single nation does not produce the same access
benefits as a U.S. agreement with a multinational community such as the EU.
192 US Airways, Continental Airlines, and Delta Air Lines, for example, have
launched service to London Heathrow. Press Release, US Airways, US Airways
Announces First Ever Service to London's Heathrow Airport (Nov. 20, 2007),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c= 196799&p=irol-newsArticle&ID- 1080176;
Press Release, Continental Airlines, Continental Airlines to Launch Twice-Daily Nonstop
Flights to Heathrow From Both New York and Houston (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=85779&p=irol-
newsArticle Print&ID=1078367; Press Release, Delta Air Lines, Delta Customers Gain
Nonstop Access to London-Heathrow, Paris-Orly and Lyon, France through Expanded
Trans-Atlantic Partnership (Oct. 17, 2007),
http://delta.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=576. Meanwhile airlines like Air
France, Aer Lingus, and British Airways (through subsidiary "Open Skies") began
operating transatlantic routes from EU member states other than their own. Press Release,
Delta Air Lines, Delta Customers Gain Nonstop Access to London-Heathrow via Los
Angeles, Complementing Service from Atlanta, New York-JFK (Dec. 11, 2007),
http://delta.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=485; United Airlines Press Office,
supra note 123 (regarding Aer Lingus); Robert Wall, British Airways To Launch
OpenSkies, AVIATION WEEK (Jan. 9, 2008),
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story-generic.jsp?channel=comm&id=news/O
PEN01098.xml&headline=British%20Airways%2OTo%20Launch%200penSkies.
193 Aeropolitics, supra note 186 ("[S]ome ... have expressed skepticism that either
side would open an aviation trade war by suspending parts of the 2007 Agreement .....").
194 Id. DOT may have granted antitrust immunity to a transatlantic alliance in order
to avoid a revocation of Open Skies rights. Id.
195 See Cavinato, supra note 160, at 337 (recommending a three-pronged test to
determine whether foreign investment restrictions should be loosened with respect to any
particular nations). Cavinato's first prong requires that the nation with whom the U.S.
loosens its restrictions (1) be a party to an Open Skies agreement with the U.S., and (2)
provide U.S. citizens with reciprocal investment benefits in its airlines. Id. at 338-39.
196 ASS'N OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES, supra note 186, at 2.
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Additionally, the effectiveness of the U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement
practically requires that foreign ownership liberalization be tailored to EU
nations. If a non-EU entity were to acquire control of a U.S. airline, it is
possible that the airline would lose its EU access privileges granted in the
U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement. 197 A U.S. airline with an extensive route
network in Europe could potentially be blocked from all of its EU
destinations if a non-EU foreign entity-located in a country without an
Open Skies agreement with the EU-took control of the U.S. airline. The
potential for lost traffic rights has presented itself in a number of situations.
Most recently, Russia threatened to ban Austrian Airlines from flying into
Russia after Germany's Lufthansa acquired nearly 50% ownership in the
airline. 198 Russia wanted the Austrian government, with whom it was
engaged in a bilateral agreement, to "prove [Austrian Airlines] is still
Austrian." 199 Because of this potential scenario and the importance of EU
route networks to U.S. airlines, the U.S. should limit foreign ownership to
EU entities to gain the full benefits of the U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement.
2. The EU's Commitment to Decreasing Government Influence and
Subsidies in the Airlines
The U.S.'s agreement with the EU also provides a more direct
commitment to eliminating government interference and subsidies than other
Open Skies agreements seem to include. While no Open Skies agreement
directly speaks to the issue of government control or ownership of the
airlines, 200 most agreements have precatory language that calls for
"minimum government interference and regulation."'201 Out of the twenty-
five agreements observed in this Note, the U.S. agreement with India is the
197 Patel, supra note 10, at 511 (illustrating how traffic rights from the U.S. to the
EU can be lost if the acquirer of a U.S. airline were from a country which did not have
full traffic rights to the EU).
198 Pilita Clark, Russia Threatens Ban on Austrian Airlines, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2010, at 1.
199 Id
200 This determination is based on the review of twenty-five open skies agreements
between the U.S. and other countries, including Canada, Chile, Ghana, Guatemala,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan (memorandum of understanding), Kuwait, Laos
(draft), Liberia, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar,
Singapore, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, and Turkey, as well as the U.S. agreement
with the EU.
201 See, e.g., Model Open Skies Agreement, U.S. Dep't of State 1 (2008), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I 4970.pdf.
[Vol. 72:1
NA VIGA TING THE COMPLEX SKIES
only agreement to leave out this language, 20 2 while the agreement with
Morocco calls for "minimum appropriate regulation." 20 3 Regardless, these
calls for minimum government interference do not have the force of law in
Open Skies agreements.
Where the U.S.-EU agreement does provide more focus is in its anti-
subsidy provisions. In fact, the agreement includes precatory language stating
that the parties recognize "government subsidies may adversely affect airline
competition," 204 language that is not provided in other Open Skies
agreements. Bearing greater legal weight is Article 14 of the agreement
pertaining to government subsidies and support. 205 The provision plainly
states, "The Parties recognise that government subsidies and support may
adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of airlines to compete in
providing the international air transportation governed by this
Agreement. '20 6 As an enforcement mechanism, a party finding a breach of
this provision can request a meeting of a joint committee, composed of
members of both parties, to decide the matter 207 or it can approach
government entities belonging to the breaching party diplomatically. 20 8
In contrast, most other agreements mention the issue of subsidies only
briefly as part of pricing provisions. 20 9 The pricing discussion is usually
contained in Article 12 of the typical agreement, 210 which reads, "Each Party
shall allow prices for air transportation to be established by each designated
airline based upon commercial considerations in the marketplace.
Intervention by the Parties shall be limited to ... protection of airlines from
202 Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of India, U.S.-India, Apr. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/114735.pdf.
203 Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, U.S.-Morocco, Oct. 10, 2000,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,165, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/130941.pdf.
204 U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 77, at 5.
205 Id. art. 14.
206 Id. art. 14(1).
207 Id. art. 14(2); see also id. art. 18 (discussing the composition and procedures of
the joint committee).
208 Id. art. 14(3).
209 The Model Open Skies Agreement does not mention government subsidies, but
most agreements will include it as part of pricing provisions. Model Open Skies
Agreement, supra note 201.
210 In the U.S.'s agreement with Canada, the pricing provision, using similar
language as that used in other agreements, is in article 6. Air Transport Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada, U.S.-Can., art. 6, Mar. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1 14887.pdf.
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prices that are artificially low due to direct or indirect governmental subsidy
or support."' 211 The agreements specify "intervention" be provided in the
form of consultations and direct communication with the offending party,
with the desired outcome being a fair price on which both sides can agree.2 12
If no agreement is reached, the allegedly problematic pricing continues in
effect.213 Although some enforcement against the use of subsidies exists in
these provisions, the enforcement is primarily centered on the issue of unfair
pricing and is relatively weak at best. If subsidies are found to result in unfair
pricing, then the enforcement mechanisms can be triggered, though they may
have little effect if the unfair pricing is allowed to continue. In a situation
where subsidies do not result in pricing deemed unfair, however, no
enforcement mechanisms are triggered at all.
The agreement between the U.S. and EU directly attacks the use of
subsidies as they affect competition overall, not merely pricing.214 The U.S.-
EU agreement, in that sense, has more force in directly confronting the use of
subsidies, and the joint committee, provided under Article 18 of the
agreement, may have more control over the resolution of any subsidy
problem entirely, not only from the perspective of unfair pricing. In other
words, a party under the U.S.-EU agreement can complain about government
subsidies of the other party, regardless of whether unfair pricing is
experienced, and the resolution of the complaint is likely to tackle the very
existence of the subsidy itself, not merely treating the unfair pricing effects
of that subsidy. The U.S.-EU agreement is more likely to discourage the use
of subsidies as a result.
3. A Loss of Nationalism in EU Airlines
Alongside the U.S. and EU's written commitment toward minimizing
government interference and subsidies, the landscape of the commercial
211 See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Malaysia, U.S.-Malay., art. 12(1), Jun. 21,
1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12,871, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I14289.pdf.
212 See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Qatar, U.S.-Qatar, art. 12(3), Oct. 3, 2001,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I14398.pdf ("If either Party
believes that any such price is inconsistent with the considerations set forth in paragraph
(1) of this Article, it shall request consultations and notify the other Party of the reasons
for its dissatisfaction as soon as possible.").
213 See, e.g., id.
214 U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 77, art. 14(2) (allowing recourse if one party
finds that a government subsidy being provided to an airline of the other party adversely
affects the "fair and equal opportunity of the airlines of the first Party to compete").
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airline industry in Europe also diminishes the likelihood of any government
involvement. The landscape is now dominated by several large, privatized
carriers, including airlines that are still considered national flag carriers as
well as private low fare carriers. The flag carriers of Western European
countries, in particular, have "achieved the highest or at least a sufficiently
high degree of competitiveness," 215 such that government protectionism
through airline control or route restrictions is no longer needed. As a result,
the nationalist protectionism smaller countries exhibit toward their airlines216
is not as prevalent in Europe as it once was, making government interference
in airline operations less likely.
In one sign that EU member states are no longer as protective of their
home carriers, airline consolidation in the EU has resulted in several of the
larger EU airlines taking ownership of smaller airlines from EU states other
than their own. The Air France takeover of the Dutch airline KLM is one
example, though KLM initially preserved its Dutch control and identity for
traffic rights purposes. 217 The two entities still appear separate to the
traveling public, but a single holding company owns both carriers. 218 In a
similar fashion, Lufthansa has taken over Swiss International Air Lines 219
and heavily invested in Austrian Airlines, 220 Brussels Airlines, 221 and the
United Kingdom's British Midland International (bmi). 222 More recently,
Spain's Iberia Airlines and the U.K.'s British Airways signed a merger
agreement of their two holding companies in 2010.223 The fact that EU
members are now willing to allow airlines from other member states to take
215 ZYLICZ, supra note 62, at 23.
216 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
217 Alistair Osborne & Henry Samuel, Air France Agrees Takeover of KLM, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH UK, Oct. 1, 2003, at 34, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fmance/2864707/Air-France-agrees-takeover-of-KLM.html.
2181d.
219 LUFTHANSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 204 (2009).
220 Id. at 4.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 7.
223 Merger Project Between International Consolidated Airlines Group, S.A., Iberia,
Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., and BA Holdco, S.A. 9-10 (June 2010),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NTIxMjd8Q2hpbGRJR
DOtMXxUeXBIPTM=&t=l. The trading of shares in each airline's holding company
ceased in January 2011, with new shares issued for the consolidated company,
International Consolidated Airlines Group, S.A., and its primary listing on the London
Stock Exchange. Steve Rothwell, British Airways Strike Risk Looms as Ballot
Overshadows Merger with Iberia, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2011, 8:44 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-19/british-airways-strike-risk-looms-as-ballot-
overshadows-merger-with-iberia.html.
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over part or all of their home airlines highlights the fact that EU member
governments are taking a more hands-off approach to airline governance. If
any of these privatized EU carriers were to take control of a U.S. carrier, it
would be unlikely that the government of the EU carrier would decide to
exert any control.
The five largest airlines or airline groups based in the EU are Lufthansa,
Air France-KLM, Ryanair, easyJet, and British Airways,224 and all five are
private carriers. 225 Based on size alone, they are the airline groups most
likely to invest in U.S. carriers if presented the opportunity. Three of these
groups-Lufthansa, Air France-KLM, and British Airways-and their
subsidiaries were once national flag carriers in their own right, and were only
privatized in the past several decades. 226 While these companies are now
competitively the strongest carriers in Europe and have no need for
government involvement, smaller flag carriers in Europe are also aiming for
privatization. The Italian government, for example, allowed its national
carrier Alitalia to be privatized despite political turmoil. 227 Nevertheless,
224 Based on 2009 figures. The Lufthansa group carried over 76.5 million
passengers. Investor Info 12/09 with Traffic Data for December, LUFTHANSA INVESTOR
RELATIONS, http://investor-relations.lufthansa.com/fileadmin/downloads/en/fmancial-
reports/traffic-figures/Lufthansa/2009/LH-Investor-Info-2009-12-e.pdf (last visited Jan.
4, 2011). Air France-KLM carried nearly 71.4 million passengers. Air France-KLM
Financial Information, AIR FRANCE-KLM FINANCE, http://www.airfranceklm-
finance.com/passenger-freight-traffic.html&navigationAnnee=2009 (last visited Jan. 4,
2011). Ryanair carried under 65.3 million passengers. Passenger Traffic 2002/2011,
RYANAIR, http://www.ryanair.com/en/investor/traffic-figures (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
EasyJet carried under 46.1 million passengers. EasyJet Monthly Traffic Statistics for
December 2009, EASYJET PLC, http://corporate.easyjet.com/investors/monthly-traffic-
statistics/2009/december.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2011). British Airways carried over
31.8 million passengers during its financial year ending March 31, 2010. See Preliminary
Reults [sic] for the Year to March 31, 2010, INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES GROUP,
http://www.iagshares.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=240949&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1497981 &highlight= (follow link for the full PDF file) (last visited
Feb. 10, 2011).
225 See AIR FRANCE-KLM, ANNUAL REPORT 2008-09, at 55 (2009); BRITISH
AIRWAYS PLC., 2008/09 ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 61 (2009); EASYJET PLC,
ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009, at 44 (2009); LUFTHANSA, ANNUAL REPORT
2008, at 30 (2009); RYANAIR LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 101 (2009).
226 See Colin Baker, Air France-KLM Get Merger Approval, FLIGHTGLOBAL (Jan. 6,
2004), http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2004/06/01/182217/air-france-klm-get-
merger-approval.html (discussing the French government's divestment of majority
ownership in Air France); Kelley, supra note 165, at 553 (discussing how British
Airways was privatized); A Privatizing of Lufthansa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at D5
(noting how the German government would sell shares to become a minority owner of
Lufthansa).
227 Martial Tardy, Alitalia Privatization Moving Smoothly, AVIATION DAILY, Jan.
28, 2008, at 2; see also Strike Hits Alitalia After Privatization, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009,
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some EU nations seeking privatization have been unsuccessful in doing SO2 2 8
or have renationalized their airlines. 229 Hungary is an example of an EU
member state that renationalized its flag carrier to prevent the airline's
collapse. 230 These smaller airlines are less likely to have the financial
wherewithal to acquire controlling stakes in U.S. airlines, so even if U.S.
foreign ownership restrictions were relaxed for all EU entities, the smaller,
government-controlled airlines of Europe would be unlikely to acquire a U.S.
airline or pose a threat to CRAF.
The relative financial weakness of smaller, state-owned EU airlines
should be contrasted with the strength of airlines belonging to other nations
where a foreign government is both a signatory of an Open Skies agreement
and controls the dominant national carrier. In the latter situations, it may be
possible for a foreign airline to have the financial resources and the interest
in acquiring a controlling stake in a U.S. carrier. As one example, the
government of Singapore, 231 through its holding company Temasek
Holdings,232 controls the city-state's flag carrier Singapore Airlines. 233 That
airline acquired a 49% interest in the United Kingdom's Virgin Atlantic
Airways (Virgin Atlantic). 234 If the EU's ownership restrictions were relaxed
to allow foreign control, Singapore Airlines could purchase a controlling
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/business/worldbusiness/19iht-
l9alitalia. 19485432.html (discussing union action against the newly privatized Alitalia).
228 See, e.g., Frank Lynch, The Privatization of the Transportation Industry in
Formerly Communist Countries: A Study of Poland and Hungary, 48 ADMIN. L. REv.
559, 565-68 (1996) (discussing a long history of unsuccessful attempts to privatize the
Polish carrier LOT Polish Airlines).
229 See Brian Strauss, Hungarian Government Reclaims Struggling Malev, ATW
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010), http://atwonline.com/airline-finance-data/news/hungarian-
govemment-reclaims-struggling-malev-0427 (discussing the Hungarian government's
rescue of Malev Hungarian Airlines in the form of reacquired ownership).
230 id.
231 It should be noted that the U.S. has executed Open Skies agreements with both
Singapore and Thailand, countries which are discussed infra in the text accompanying
notes 232-37.
232 Temasek Holdings Factsheet, TEMASEK HOLDINGS (Feb. 1, 2010),
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/pdf/Temasek / 20Holdings%2OFact%20Sheetupdat
ed_010210.pdf (noting the Singaporean government's ownership of Temasek).
233 SINGAPORE AIRLINES, LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2008/09, at 215 (2009) (noting that
Temasek Holdings owns 54.57% of Singapore Airlines' shares).
234 Id. at 212. There is ongoing discussion about the possibility of Singapore
Airlines selling its stake in Virgin Atlantic. See Chan Sue Ling, Singapore Air New CEO
May Shed Virgin Atlantic Stake, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 5, 2011, 11:12 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-05/singapore-air-new-ceo-may-shed-
virgin-atlantic-stake.html.
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stake in Virgin Atlantic, which would effectively result in Virgin Atlantic
being owned by the Singapore government.
While the Singapore government may exert minimal interference in the
operations of the businesses it owns,235 other governments owning similarly
large national flag carriers are not as deferential. Thai Airways International
(THAI), for example, is frequently a target of Thai political interference. The
state-controlled airline recently succumbed to political pressure from
members of the government when it sought to discontinue service on
particular domestic routes within Thailand, handing the routes over to its
small, low-fare affiliate carrier, Nok Air.236 Politicians whose home cities
would have been affected by the route changes convinced THAI
management to partially reverse its decision and to keep one daily domestic
flight to Ubon Ratchathani, against better business judgment.237 According to
local observers, the fact that THAI partially reversed its business plans spoke
"volumes about how political interference overrides [THAI's] business
decisions, and the airline's vulnerability to the whims of politicians." 238 If
THAI were allowed to own and control a U.S. airline, it would therefore not
be difficult to imagine the Thai government pressuring THAI and its U.S.
affiliate to act according to its political will and counter to the needs of
CRAF.
235 See Ho Ching, Executive Director and CEO, Temasek Holdings, Ltd., Address at
the Institute of Policy Studies Corporate Associates Lunch: Temasek Holdings: Building
Sustainable Value (Feb. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/news-room/pressspeeches/12_02_2004.htm
("[T]he government took care not to be involved in the business decisions of the
government-linked companies . . . .This hands-off self-restraint enabled the Temasek
companies to grow and thrive on sound commercial principles, unfettered by bureaucratic
impositions or non-commercial government directives.").
236 Boonsong Kositchotethana, THAI Bows to Pressure to Keep Ubon Route,
BANGKOK POST, Feb. 15, 2010,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/aviation/32939/thai-bows-to-pressure-to-keep-
ubon-route.
237 Id. The Bangkok-Ubon Ratchathani route lost the carrier 74.9 million baht
(roughly 2.3 million U.S. dollars) per year on average. Id.
2 38 Id. The airline again came under scrutiny by government officials when the CEO
proposed setting up a low cost subsidiary airline that would be minority-owned by a
Singapore carrier with ties to the Singaporean government. Although much of the dispute
was over the possibility of foreign control of a domestic airline, an issue that the U.S.
DOT itself scrutinizes, statements by the Thai Transport Minister suggested that the
ministry would scrutinize the deal based on the soundness of the business decision in
addition to whether the airline would be placed under foreign control. Boonsong
Kositchotethana & Amornrat Mahitthirook, PM Patches Up Thai Tiger Row, BANGKOK
POST, Sept. 3, 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/194355/pm-
patches-up-thai-tiger-row (The Transport Minister stated, "As THAI (the airline) is under
the ministry's supervision, we reserve the right to put the issue under our scrutiny.").
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Other examples of state-controlled airlines with the resources to
potentially acquire controlling stakes in U.S. airlines are Emirates 239 and
Etihad240 in the United Arab Emirates, and three of the largest air carriers in
Africa: South African Airways,241 EgyptAir, 242 and Royal Air Maroc 243 in
Morocco. Within this list of countries, the U.S. has executed Open Skies
agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Morocco. In Europe, several
airlines remain state-owned, though they are relatively small players in their
region. The largest among these are TAP Portugal, 244 Finnair, 245 Czech
Airlines,246 and LOT Polish Airlines.247 All of these European carriers have
the potential to acquire controlling interests in U.S. carriers with varying
degrees of likelihood, but for the time being, their influence is overshadowed
by the plethora of significantly larger, privatized carriers in Europe.
Significant fiscal constraint resulting from economic weakness and
239 THE EMIRATES GROUP, ANNUAL REPORT 2008-2009, at 76 (2009).
240 See No Merger with Etihad, Emirates Says, GULFNEWS.COM, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://gulfnews.com/business/aviation/no-merger-with-etihad-emirates-says- 1.147274
(noting that an Abu Dhabi bailout package did not involve a merger of government-
owned Etihad Airways with Emirates). Etihad Airways has reportedly expressed interest
in acquiring a stake in Virgin Atlantic. Steve Rothwell & Tamara Walid, Virgin Atlantic
Says Still in Early Stages of Assessing Future, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23,
2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-23/virgin-atlantic-says-
still-in-early-stages-of-assessing-future.html.
241 SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT: BUILDING ON
RESTRUCTURING 59 (2009).
242 See Ahmed Namatalla, Soon Boarding, BUSINESS TODAY EGYPT, Apr. 2006,
https://www.zawya.com/story.cff/sidZAWYA20060411052834/Soon%20Boarding
(discussing the Egyptian government's decision to offer shares of Egyptair to the public).
243 Mark Pilling, Royal Air Maroc To Be Privatised: World Air Transport Forum
News, FLIGHTGLOBAL (Oct. 30, 2008, 1:44 PM),
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/airline-business/2008/10/royal-air-maroc-to-be-
privatis.html (discussing the Moroccan government's planned privatization of Royal Air
Maroc). As of early 2010, there is no confirmation that the government has relinquished
its controlling stake in the airline.
244 GRUPO TAP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 100 (2009) (noting that the group's capital
is provided by the Portuguese government).
245 Shareholders, FINNAIR GROUP,
http://www.finnairgroup.com/investors/investors_4.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
246 CZECH AIRLINES, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 8 (2009).
247 Ownership Structure, LOT POLISH AIRLINES,
http://www.lot.com/web/lot/proprietary-
structure;jsessionid=2167D558BA885264792AD6D3E335577F.13 (last visited Jan. 4,
2011); see also Lynch, supra note 228 (discussing the history of attempts at privatizing
LOT Polish Airlines).
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government debt in Europe 248 has also diminished the likelihood that any
European government-controlled entity-airline or otherwise-would seek
to acquire a controlling stake in a U.S. airline.
4. The Existence of NA TO and Its Possible Effects on CRAF
Obligations
The effect of state-control of foreign carriers in the EU is mitigated by
the fact that many EU nations 249 are part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), a group whose multilateral treaty provides mutual
defense protection to its signatories. When signing the North Atlantic Treaty
(the treaty which forms NATO), the signatories agree, under Article 5, that
"an armed attack against one or more of them ... shall be considered an
attack against them all."' 250 Once an attack is recognized, the signatories
further agree to assist the attacked party and to take "such action as [they
deem] necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area." 251 Ideally, governments of NATO
member countries would therefore be expected to assist in U.S. military
operations should the U.S. be attacked. If the foreign government indirectly
controlling a U.S. carrier were a NATO member, it would arguably not
hesitate to allow the U.S. carrier to meet its CRAF obligations, even if
political forces in the NATO state opposed military involvement. 252
In practice, however, NATO's Article 5 has only been invoked once in
the history of NATO-the September 11 th terrorist attacks253-and during
that one instance, the U.S. was directly attacked, a situation in which Article
5 clearly applies. CRAF, on the other hand, was activated most recently
during the start of the 2003 Iraq War as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom,254
248 Alan Clendenning & Shawn Pogatchnik, Gloom, Anger Spreads As European
Economies Teeter, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 0/nov/24/ireland-unveils-4-year-plan-claw-
back-20-billion/.
249 One exception of note is Finland, whose carrier is state-owned. See supra note
245.
250 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
[hereinafter NATO Treaty].
251 Id.
252 See Cavinato, supra note 160, at 339-42 (arguing that foreign entities from
nations joining the U.S. in mutual defense pacts, like NATO, are more likely to honor
CRAF obligations should they have control over U.S. carriers); see also IDA CRAF
Study, supra note 132, at 45 (suggesting that national security treaties would strengthen
CRAF commitments by U.S. carriers owned by foreign entities).
253 Cavinato, supra note 160, at 340.
254 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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and since that war was not a result of a NATO member being directly
attacked, Article 5 was never invoked. Although some NATO members
partnered to provide military intervention to fulfill what they saw were the
general purposes of NATO, 255 not all members felt obligated to assist the
war effort. Some NATO members disagreed with the U.S.'s war policies in
Iraq, particularly military action without approval from the United Nations
Security Council, 256 and because their NATO commitment under Article 5
was not invoked, they were under no duty to participate. NATO members
France, Belgium, Germany, and Turkey, for example, chose not to fully
assist the U.S. at the outset of the Iraq conflict.2 57 Had those states controlled
U.S. carriers at the time of their opposition to the war, they had the potential
to affect CRAF support for the war effort.
Despite the risks created by the Iraq War scenario, having the North
Atlantic Treaty in place still provides some assurance that entities from
NATO member nations will usually honor CRAF commitments should they
gain control of a U.S. airline. All NATO members are likely to allow U.S.
carriers under their control to participate in CRAF during times when Article
5 is invoked, and many members may still allow these same carriers to
participate should the U.S. launch another military intervention similar to the
Iraq War, depending on the circumstances. 258
255 This includes purposes influenced by the precatory language in the North
Atlantic Treaty, which recognizes that NATO members "are determined to safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples ... . They seek to promote
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." NATO Treaty, supra note 250. The
language further states that the members "are resolved to unite their efforts for collective
defence and for the preservation of peace and security." Id.
256 Kerem Altiparmak, Bankovic: An Obstacle to the Application of the European
Convention on Human Rights in Iraq?, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 213, 215 (2004);
see also Jordan J. Paust, Use ofArmed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 546 (2002) ("[Article 53 of the United Nations
Charter] prohibits regional organizations [like NATO] from engaging in 'enforcement
action under [the Security Council's] authority' without its authorization.").
257 Jane Gilliland Dalton, The United States National Security Strategy: Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 60, 77-78 ("Turkey refused to permit U.S.
forces to cross Turkish territory into Northern Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom .... ");
Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 808
n.28 (2003) (listing several countries, including France, Belgium, and Germany, who
vocally opposed the use of force in Iraq).
258 This would assume that the U.S. would not wage war without the backing of
some NATO partners.
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B. DOT Should Continue To Monitor Changes in Airline Ownership
Despite the aspirational goal of minimizing government interference,
Open Skies agreements around the world, including the agreement between
the U.S. and the EU, lack any language directly precluding the possibility of
government ownership. The danger that a state-owned entity-whether in the
EU or in another country-poses to the CRAF program in the event of
foreign ownership liberalization must continue to be a factor in determining a
U.S. airline's fitness for operations. For this reason, if foreign ownership
restrictions were removed with respect to EU entities, DOT should continue
to conduct studies of an airline's ownership and control. There are two
possibilities that should raise concern: 1) if the U.S. were to relax ownership
restrictions with respect to EU entities only, then DOT would need to ensure
that the EU entity is not controlled by a non-EU entity, and 2) DOT needs to
ensure that the EU entity is not controlled by a state government. Each of
these concerns requires consistent attention to changes in the ownership
structure of the foreign entity, as well as the political climate of the foreign
country.
EU law provides that member states (or the nationals thereof) own at
least 50% of any EU airline and that such states or nationals have effective
control of the airline. 259 Assuming this law does not change and is effectively
enforced by the EU, DOT should not have to worry about non-EU entities
controlling those in the EU. If, however, the EU decided it wanted to loosen
its restrictions to investors from other nations with which the EU had signed
an Open Skies agreement, for example, then DOT would need to consider
whether the change gives control of a U.S. airline to a non-EU foreign
country.260
Of more concern is the second possible scenario: that an EU member
state would re-exert control over its flag carrier, similar to how Malev
Hungarian renationalized its airline as discussed supra.26 1 EU member states
could also temporarily gain ownership over their flag carriers to bail them
out of financially difficult situations, especially if no private investors
express any interest in the failing airline. 262 The moment such forms of
259 Regulation 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
September 2008 on Common Rules for the Operation of Air Services in the Community
(Recast), art. 4(f), 2008 O.J. (L 293) 6.
260 The Virgin Atlantic Airways and Singapore Airlines example, discussed supra in
the text accompanying notes 231-34, illustrates this possibility.
261 See Strauss, supra note 229.
262 This was discussed as having occurred in Europe during the 1990s and in the
U.S. as recently as the early 2000s with America West Airlines. See supra notes 169-73,
and accompanying text.
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nationalization or emergency ownership take place, DOT should review a
U.S. carrier's ownership with ties to the EU member in question.
C. The Distinction Between Cabotage and Increased Foreign
Investment
Any discussion involving a liberalization of foreign ownership
restrictions should preclude the possibility for increased cabotage rights-
that is, the right for a foreign airline to commercially operate U.S. domestic
services. Foreign carriers in such a scenario would likely displace some U.S.
carriers in the market, resulting in possible pressure for DOD to open up the
CRAF program to those foreign carriers. CRAF commitments are likely
enforceable in situations where a U.S. carrier is controlled by a foreign
carrier; it is less certain that these same commitments would be enforceable
against a participating foreign carrier--one that is registered and
incorporated in a foreign country. 263 Foreign airlines, both public and private,
can be influenced by their home governments. 264 Just as U.S. airlines are
subject to U.S. regulations and potential U.S. government control, foreign
carriers still fly subject to their home country's "sovereignty, regulatory
authority, or influence," 265 thereby weakening their commitments to CRAF
even if they had earlier chosen to participate.
While it is still likely that foreign carriers operating domestic U.S.
services will want to abide by their commitments to CRAF, it is less certain
that they will ultimately fulfill those commitments when their home
governments vehemently oppose a U.S. war effort.266 As a possible form of
enforcement, a foreign government could threaten to withhold the foreign
airline's registration or certification to operate services if the airline chose to
serve the U.S. military. In some cases, the foreign government may be able to
seize or condemn the airline's aircraft. On the reverse side, U.S. airlines,
even those controlled by foreign carriers, can be subject to a DOT revocation
of their operating certification. 267 Without other recourse, U.S. airlines are
strongly deterred from reneging on CRAF commitments by the fact that they
may be forced out of operation.
263 See Cavinato, supra note 160, at 329-31 (discussing the debate over whether
foreign carriers should be allowed to participate in CRAF).
264 IDA CRAF Study, supra note 132, at 44 ("Just as governments grant or deny
over-flight privileges or airport access privileges depending on international political
considerations, they could be expected to deny or delay U.S. military use of aircraft
owned by airlines under the influence or control of their citizens.").
265 Id.
266 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
267 See Cavinato, supra note 160, at 331 (noting how airlines incorporated in the
U.S. are subject to U.S. regulatory control mechanisms).
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DOT could revoke a foreign carrier's cabotage rights if the foreign
carrier did not meet its CRAF obligations, though it is not certain whether
this threat of revocation will actually deter the foreign carrier from reneging
on its commitments. If the foreign carrier's operations in the U.S. are
minimal, the foreign carrier can afford to discontinue these routes. If they are
significant, the foreign carrier's home country could attempt to retaliate by
revoking any access rights to U.S. carriers. This may weigh in the U.S.'s
favor, as U.S. access to another country's domestic market is less likely to be
as valuable as foreign access to the U.S. domestic market. Moreover, the
revocation of a U.S. airline's access to a single international country will
usually not make or break an airline's operations. Problematic situations will
arise when a U.S. airline has large-scale operations in the foreign country in
question, such that revocation of access rights will cripple the airline.
Examples of these scenarios include Delta Air Line's operations in
Amsterdam, Paris, and Tokyo.268 Additionally, if multiple U.S. carriers serve
the foreign country, the aggregate effect of shutting down direct access to
that country may be significant. In the end, maintaining a set of U.S.
incorporated airlines with U.S. registered aircraft to operate U.S. domestic
services addresses accountability issues and avoids potential political
problems presented by cabotage. Even if it is controlled by a foreign entity, a
U.S. airline with a U.S. principal place of business and U.S. registered
aircraft is still accountable to the U.S. government.
V. CONCLUSION
The liberalization of foreign ownership restrictions is a fiercely political
process involving a plethora of domestic and international actors, from
members of Congress who must define these restrictions, to DOT who must
interpret and apply these restrictions, to the Department of State and foreign
governments, who must negotiate with these restrictions in mind. Through
their actions in recent years, the Department of State and DOT have
continued the liberalization of the airline industry at a cross border level,
tempered by reasonable efforts to maintain U.S. national security and
international fairness. Unfortunately, Congress's actions over the past
decades have stifled this liberalization.
It is Congress's turn to catch up to the progress Executive Branch agency
professionals have charted for it and to take a small step in a different
direction. That step, of course, should not involve knocking completely down
268 See, e.g., Press Release, Delta Air Lines, Delta Air Lines Reports February
Traffic (Mar. 4, 2010), http://delta.mediaroom.com/index.php?s--43&item=962 (noting in
its stock language for press releases that it considers Amsterdam, Paris, and Tokyo to be
cities with Delta hub operations).
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the wall to foreign investment, but, rather, it should involve a relaxation of
restrictions where relaxation makes sense. Instead of opening up U.S. airlines
to the world, investment should be opened up first to the EU only. Instead of
ignoring any changes in ownership, DOT should continue what it is doing
now: certifying an airline for operations only if the airline meets particular
ownership requirements, including a bar on any control by foreign
governments. In this way, the liberalization process can be managed in a fair
and methodical way, sensitive to the needs of the country and of the airline
industry.

